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Abstract 
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Purpose To contribute to the academic and policy discussion on 
whether there are sufficient grounds to believe that 
auditor independence will be enhanced by the EU audit 
reform in Sweden. 
 
Method This thesis has been conducted with a qualitative 
research method tending towards a positivist spirit. 
 
Theoretical perspective Previous studies on the perceptions of auditor 
independence have been used to position the findings of 
this study.  
 
Empirical foundation Data from 13 conducted interviews with different key 
Swedish stakeholders and a survey to private investors, 
financial analysts, fund managers, top management and 
auditors. The following main groups are identified as 
key Swedish stakeholders; Financial market actors, PIEs 
and the audit profession. 
 
Conclusions The findings of this study suggest that the EU has not 
based the audit reform on entirely groundless 
assumptions as indications has been found that the 
perceptions of financial market actors are affected by 
long audit-client relationships and NAS. However, 
market reactions may be absent as the results of this 
study suggests that these actors might not evaluate the 
auditor’s independence. Therefore, the EU might not be 
able to achieve the objectives of the audit reform. 
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1. Introduction 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) identify auditor independence as a cornerstone in the structure of 
auditing theory. By referring to Wilcox (1952), they argue that the independence of the auditor 
is the ultimate condition for the value of an audit opinion, and without it, the opinion will be 
worthless. The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) has developed 
a framework to map the key elements argued to promote audit quality. Much attention is 
directed towards the importance of auditor independence, and the board points out how 
impaired independence may compromise the professional judgement, integrity and 
objectiveness of the team involved and thereby lead to biased evaluation and bad decision-
making (IAASB, 2013). According to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
requirement of auditor independence is based on two goals. First, it is essential for the quality 
of the audit that the auditor is free from any external factors that may influence the auditor’s 
opinion. Secondly, the independent auditor is a condition for the reliability of an audit, and 
investors’ confidence in the financial statements is highly dependent on the auditor’s ability to 
remain objective (SEC, 2000). Despite being among the most widely discussed aspects of the 
audit profession, there still seems to be variations in the perception of what it means for an 
auditor to be independent, and furthermore how to ultimately regulate this independence.  
 
A number of corporate scandals uncovered during the last decades have triggered a broad social 
debate on the role of the auditor in business today. The global response to the audit failure and 
lacking independence in the 2001 Enron scandal has proven an important basis for the 
development in this field. In the U.S the collapse of Enron led to the establishment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and in Europe the 8th directive on Statutory Audit was 
subsequently issued in 2006. Auditor independence has increasingly become a subject to 
governmental control in the aftermath of these regulatory changes, rather than self-regulation.  
 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis the independence of auditors was again up to debate. In 
a green paper discussing audit policies, the European Commission suggested that auditors had 
failed to fulfill their societal role as they had given unqualified audit opinions to struggling 
banks (2010a). Therefore, it was believed that auditors had contributed to the crisis and were 
partially responsible for the associated costs to society. The Commission stated that they wished 
to reinforce auditor independence as this would enhance auditors’ possibilities of fulfilling their 
societal role and it was suggested that mandatory audit firm rotation and further restrictions of 
non-audit services (NAS) could help achieve this. 
 
The green paper about audit policy was criticized by the audit profession, academics, preparers 
and users in the years following, and many expressed doubts that these measures would help 
achieve the objective of enhanced auditor independence (European Commission, 2011a). 
Despite the critique these suggestions made it into European Union legislation when both a 
directive and a regulation was passed in 2014. These will begin to apply in all member states 
on the 17th of June 2016 (Regulation (EU) No 537/2014). The regulation imposes mandatory 
audit firm rotation for all public-interest entities (PIEs) after ten years with the same firm (art. 
17) as well as the prohibition of certain non-audit services (art. 5).  
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As a member state of the European Union, Sweden is obligated to incorporate the new directive 
and regulation into the national legislation. The responses to the green paper from Swedish 
institutions and organizations, as well as the Swedish auditing profession suggest a mixed feel 
towards the reform with many actors questioning the effectiveness of mandatory audit firm 
rotation and NAS restrictions in a Swedish context (e.g. The Swedish Shareholder’s 
Association, 2010; Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2010; The Swedish Institute of 
Authorised Public Accountants, 2010). Further, the debate has been extensively covered in the 
media, highlighting the differences and common grounds on which the Swedish stakeholders 
review the reform.  
 
In a recent radio debate, Dan Brännström from the Swedish Institute of Authorised Public 
Accountants, and Albin Ränner from the Swedish Shareholder’s Association met to share and 
discuss their views on the EU audit reform. Audit firm rotation, conflict of interest and the 
impact non-audit services may have on auditor independence were critically discussed - and 
disagreed on. Ränner emphasized the importance of the soon-to-be implemented regulation, 
indicating a strong need for improved control of auditor independence. On the link between 
NAS and independence, he pointed out the problematic aspect of good client relations, stating 
that “when corporate scandals are revealed, it is rarely the auditor that discloses this 
information”. Brännström, on the other hand, did not express any concerns that NAS impair 
auditor independence, and requested evidence to underpin this argument. When discussing the 
effects of mandatory audit firm rotation, Brännström argued that the auditor-client relationship 
and the company knowledge is of great importance to the audit quality; “It is irrational to allow 
the clock to decide when the auditors should rotate […] It takes time to become acquainted with 
new companies”. In response to this, Ränner concluded that regardless of these supporting 
arguments “the auditor is not independent after 10 years. That is impossible” (Sveriges Radio, 
2016).  
 
1.1 Problem forumulation 
The amount of research on auditor independence is, as the theory chapter will illustrate, 
comprehensive. One may argue that the level of research is a reflection of the rather subjective 
basis auditor independence is perceived and evaluated on. Authors have argued that auditor 
independence is a socially constructed phenomenon (Mautz, 1975; Kouakou et al., 2013), 
indicating that how it is perceived will vary depending on background, social norms and other 
contextual factors. Furthermore, the link between auditor independence and the level of 
regulation is another aspect to consider, especially in light of the move away from self-
regulation towards statutory regulation. The positive effects increased regulation is set to have 
on auditor independence can be questioned and according to a study of Windsor and Warming-
Rasmussen (2009) there is not sufficient evidence to state that additional rules in the 
professional code of ethics will result in strengthened auditor independence, neither in mind 
nor appearance. 
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With the aim to enhance auditor independence, the new EU audit directive and regulation will 
soon be implemented in all member states. While the EU has mandated that mandatory audit 
firm rotation and prohibition of certain NAS be implemented in the national legislation of each 
member state, the regulation (EU) No 537/2014 also contains a number of member state options 
giving the individual member states a high degree of flexibility in the enforcement of this 
regulation. As a consequence, each country will arguably implement and react to it differently. 
The implementation of these rules are therefore unlikely to be uniform as the individual member 
states will apply them in a way considered to be most suitable for their own national context. 
Moreover, the impact of contextual variations has become evident in a number of studies, 
indicating that the perception of Swedish actors on auditor independence and thus the 
effectiveness of these measures in enhancing auditor independence in appearance may differ 
substantially from other countries. In the U.S., a number of studies found that the provision of 
other services is perceived as independence impairing (e.g. Shockley, 1981; Schleifer & 
Shockley, 1990; Lowe et al., 1999), while a New Zealand study came to the opposite conclusion 
(Gul, 1989). Contradictions like these confirm the assumption that contextual differences could 
impact the perception of auditor independence. This indicates that both the implementation and 
perception of the EU audit reform will differ depending on country. 
 
The audit reform implies that the EU perceives auditor independence as severely influenced by 
long audit tenure and non-audit services. This is, on the other hand, only the perceptions of one 
actor and may not represent the views of other affected groups. Humphrey et al. (2011) have 
criticized the EU audit reform for being based largely on assumptions. It can therefore be 
questioned if there are sufficient grounds to believe that enhanced auditor independence will in 
fact trigger the objective of increased market stability. In order to foresee the possible impacts 
of the EU audit reform in Sweden, it is necessary to determine how the key Swedish 
stakeholders perceive these regulatory changes. Based on the contextual differences 
emphasized above, it could be argued that the stakeholders identified in Sweden will differ from 
that of other member states. Additionally, the view on auditor independence may not be in line 
with those of the European Commission, something that could compromise the effectiveness 
of the reform. 
 
1.2 The scope of this thesis 
This thesis investigates the perception of auditor independence in relation to the EU audit 
reform. However, some demarcations are necessary to limit the scope of this study. When 
discussing the EU audit reform, it is only the measures intended to strengthen auditor 
independence that are included. Moreover, the regulations pertaining to the strengthening of 
audit committees will not be investigated further. Therefore, this study will only include 
mandatory audit firm rotation and prohibition of NAS, and consequently the effects these 
measures may have on the perceptions of the key Swedish stakeholders.  
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1.3 Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the academic and policy discussion on whether 
there are sufficient grounds to believe that auditor independence will be enhanced by the EU 
audit reform in Sweden. We thus aim to answer the following main research question: 
 
Based upon the findings of our research, are there sufficient grounds to believe that auditor 
independence will be enhanced by the EU audit reform?   
 
As additional guidance in our research, we have developed the following sub-questions: 
 
What is the key Swedish stakeholders’ perception of auditor independence in relation to the 
measures of mandatory audit firm rotation and prohibition of NAS, and which consequences 
could this have on the effects of the independence regulations in EU’s audit reform? 
 
And finally, what are the key Swedish stakeholders’ reactions to the implementation of 
mandatory audit firm rotation and the prohibition of NAS in Sweden?  
 
These research questions will contribute to a discussion on the possible impacts of the EU audit 
reform in Sweden. The findings will also enable a discussion on the effects these regulatory 
changes may have on the financial market and furthermore reveal if the reform could have any 
unforeseen consequences.   
 
This study will contribute to the research as no previous study, to the best of our knowledge, 
has attempted to determine the views of the key Swedish stakeholders. The study will thus shed 
light on how the Swedish national context may affect different stakeholder’s perceptions of 
auditor independence and how this may impact the effectiveness of EU´s audit reform. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis began with a short introduction of the research topic which culminated in a set of 
research questions. The next chapter will explain how these research questions will be answered 
and which research approach this thesis adheres to. Chapter 3 contains previous research on 
auditor independence with an emphasis on studies on stakeholders´ perception of auditor 
independence. The Swedish context and the current national auditor regulations will be 
presented in chapter 4, which also contains the EU audit reform and a segment on the regulatory 
changes that will come from the implementation in Sweden. The results and analysis of our 
data collection will further be presented in chapter 5 and 6, before being combined for 
discussion in chapter 7. Finally, the thesis ends with conclusions and suggestions for future 
research in chapter 8. 
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2. Method 
2.1 Research approach 
In order to answer our research questions we consider it to be important to establish an 
understanding of the beliefs of our key stakeholders. According to Myers (2013, p. 5) a 
qualitative research method will help us achieve this and we therefore believe that this is the 
most suitable research approach for this thesis. Power and Gendron (2015) separate between 
qualitative research conducted with a positivist spirit and a constructivist spirit. Although this 
thesis will encompass both breadth and depth, we identify that our research approach tends 
towards a positivist spirit. According to Power and Gendron (2015, p 154) the focus of such 
studies is to describe behavior on average. Similarly, the aim of this thesis is to determine the 
average perceptions in the groups later defined as key stakeholders. The implications our 
research approach has on our data collection and analysis will be discussed throughout this 
method chapter.  
 
2.2 Research strategy 
Figure 2.1: Research strategy – the process of answering our research questions 
 
The process of answering our research questions was initiated by the determination of a suitable 
research approach and the subsequent execution of two different data collection methods, 
namely interviews and a survey. As this thesis adheres to the qualitative research tradition of 
using empirical observations to create knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 49), the literature 
presented may at large be considered a way to position our research in regard to previous studies 
and to present our findings in light of these.  
 
Answer to research questions
Combined discussion
Data analysis
Interviews Survey
Data collection
Interviews Survey
Identification of key Swedish stakeholders
Review of previous literature and EU audit reform documents
Review of previous studies of auditor independence Review of green paper and regulation (EU) No 537/2014
Determination of research approach
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Previous research was gathered by searching in Ebscohost and Google scholar for a 
combination of the terms auditor independence, in mind, in appearance, the EU audit reform, 
perceptions of auditor independence, non-audit services, NAS, audit firm rotation and audit 
tenure. In order to establish a broad understanding of the previous research on auditor 
independence and furthermore detect a large number of studies, the reference lists of well-cited 
articles were much used. The literature review detailing previous survey studies on the 
perceptions of auditor independence can also be regarded as an attempt to fulfill the 
transferability aspect of trustworthiness (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). 
 
Before the collection of data was initiated, key documents of the EU audit reform were 
reviewed. The green paper on audit policy and the regulation (EU) No 537/2014 was thereafter 
used as a basis for interview and survey questions. The step of reviewing literature and 
documents of the EU audit reform was followed by an identification of key Swedish 
stakeholders which was crucial in order to initiate the collection of data.  
 
As the figure illustrates the collection of data through interviews and a survey was conducted 
in parallel and the results was thereafter analyzed separately before being combined in the 
discussion. In order to achieve the transferability aspect of trustworthiness, the analysis and 
discussion will be seen in light of previous studies to allow the reader to determine whether the 
results can be transferred to other contexts or not. 
 
Following the tendency towards a positivist spirit in this qualitative study the aim has been to 
maintain objective (Power & Gendron, 2015, p. 154) something that has been considered 
essential throughout the entire process. In an attempt to demonstrate these efforts and thus show 
that the results and analysis of our study has not knowingly been influenced by our own personal 
valuations the data collection and analysis process will be described thoroughly in the following 
paragraphs. This will also contribute to the conformity aspect of trustworthiness (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008).   
 
2.3 The identification of key Swedish stakeholders 
Freeman defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the activities of an organization” (1984, p. 46). For the benefit of this thesis a 
stakeholder can thus be defined as a group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the legislative activities in regard to auditor independence of the EU. An 
important stakeholder group is clearly identified in the green paper, namely financial market 
actors such as investors. Since one of the main objectives of the EU audit reform was stated to 
be increased financial market stability (EU Commission, 2010a, p. 3), financial market actors 
are considered crucial to the achievement of this objective as it largely depends on the assumed 
impact perceptions of auditor independence may have on investment decisions.  
 
 
 
 
13 
 
The EU Commission received 688 responses to the green paper, and those of these that were 
authorized for publication can be found in CIRCABC (EU Commission, 2011c). From these 
we recognize three groups that we consider key stakeholders; the users, the preparers and the 
audit profession. In the following, the responses from these groups in Sweden will be reviewed 
and used as a basis to identify the key Swedish stakeholders. Moreover, organizations invited 
to comment on the Swedish legislative preparation of implementing the EU audit reform will 
also be addressed. 
 
2.3.1 The users 
Only one response authorized for publication was sent in by a Swedish organization 
representing the users. This response was sent in by the Swedish Shareholder’s Association 
which acts in the interest of Swedish private investors. This organization was also invited to 
submit comments to the Swedish implementation of the audit reform (Ministry of Justice, 
2015).  
 
2.3.2 The preparers 
The European Commission received three responses authorized for publication by Swedish 
preparers. No response can be found from individual Swedish companies which may be 
explained by the response sent by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, an organization 
that represents almost all of the Swedish Multi-National corporations (Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise, 2016). The Swedish Corporate Governance Board, another Swedish 
organization in the preparer group, is an organization with the purpose of promoting good 
corporate governance in listed Swedish corporations. The active participation of these two 
groups in the public debate on the EU audit reform suggest that listed companies are a key 
Swedish stakeholder. 
 
The third Swedish response to the green paper from the preparer group came from the Swedish 
Bankers’ Association (2010). This organization represents Swedish banks which can be 
identified as key stakeholders’ as they at large will also be affected by the audit reform in 
capacity of financial institutions. All of the Swedish preparer organizations that responded to 
the green paper were also invited to comment on the Swedish implementation (Ministry of 
Justice, 2015).  
 
2.3.3 The audit profession 
By far the highest number of responses to the green paper came from the audit profession. Of 
these only one represent the Swedish auditors, namely the Swedish Institute of Authorised 
Public Accountants, who was also one of the organizations invited to comment on the 
implementation of the reform in Sweden (Ministry of Justice, 2015). Although no other 
responses were sent from the Swedish audit profession most of the well-known audit firms 
submitted replies on the behalf of their entire organization (e.g Ernst & Young Global Limited, 
2010; KPMG International, 2010; PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited, 2010; BDO 
international, 2010; Grant Thornton International ltd, 2010). Therefore, these responses imply 
that audit firms in Sweden are affected by the audit reform and thus are key stakeholders. 
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2.3.4 The key Swedish stakeholders 
Above we have identified actors of the financial market actors as a key Swedish stakeholder as 
they could benefit from the regulations and are imperative for the success of the reform. 
Moreover, the response of the Swedish Shareholder’s Association has identified the private 
investors as an important financial market actor. Further, the financial analysts are also 
identified as an important actor, partly since they are assumed to be affected by the reform, but 
also since they may have an impact on investment decisions through their analyst reports with 
recommendations on whether to buy, hold or sell shares of listed companies (Healy & Palepu, 
2001, p. 416). How financial analysts perceive auditor independence and the degree to which 
they include an evaluation of the auditor in their reports may therefore also affect the 
achievement of EU’s objective. Furthermore, the Swedish Society of Financial Analysts were 
also amongst the organizations invited to comment on the Swedish implementation (Ministry 
of Justice, 2015). Apart from private investors there are also institutional investors which can 
be defined as “specialized financial institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf of 
small investors toward a specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return maximization, 
and maturity of claims” (Davis & Steil, 2004). Examples of institutional investors are pension 
funds, life insurance companies and mutual funds. Fund managers may therefore be expected 
to have an interest in the reliability of financial reports and thereby the independence of 
auditors. If this assumption is correct, fund managers’ perceptions of auditor independence is 
also crucial for the effectiveness of the EU audit reform as they govern significant amounts of 
money invested in the financial market. 
 
The responses of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and the Swedish Banker’s 
Association have identified the individual listed companies and banks as groups that are 
affected by the audit regulation. The restricted rights to decide if and when to change audit firm, 
as well as which services allowed will impact the Swedish PIE´s. Moreover, they could also 
benefit from the audit reform if the objective of increased financial market confidence is 
achieved, which may reduce their costs of capital. The reduction of the costs of capital is 
naturally beneficial to both the board of directors who are often involved in the strategy 
formulation of companies (Tricker, 2012, p. 173) as well as the top management. As company 
management have frequent contact with the auditors it is assumed that important information 
on the possible consequences of the reform can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages 
of the new regulations from a company perspective. Further, in Sweden, it is common for large 
shareholders to be involved in the appointment of auditors through membership in the 
nomination committee, giving them the opportunity to influence the decision to a larger degree 
(The Swedish Corporate Governance Code, p. 7). This group is assumed to be interested in the 
independence of the auditor as it may determine the reliability of the financial reports. 
 
Finally, the large number of responses from the audit profession certainly suggest that this 
group have a substantial interest in the reform. As experts in the field of auditing, it is assumed 
that these actors hold crucial knowledge of the possible consequences of the soon-to-be 
implemented audit reform.   
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Figure 2.2: Identified key Swedish stakeholder groups 
 
Three sub-groups that are key Swedish stakeholders have now been identified and are illustrated 
in the figure above. The aim of this thesis is to conduct interviews with representatives from all 
of the identified groups and to furthermore map their perceptions of auditor independence with 
support from a survey. 
 
2.4 Data collection 
Following the advice of Myers (2013, p. 9), more than one research method for data collection 
will be used to capture a fuller picture. This is often referred to as triangulation and allows the 
researcher to combine data that has been collected in different ways. As this thesis has a 
positivist spirit we are interested in collecting data from large number of respondents, making 
it suitable to collect data through a questionnaire survey. However, through a triangulation of 
this research method and interviews we believe that it will be possible to achieve a more 
complete representation of the perceptions of auditor independence in the key stakeholder 
groups. This will enable us to achieve both breadth and depth as the interviews allow the 
respondents to elaborate their thoughts. Moreover, according to Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 248) 
it is common for researchers to triangulate these data collection methods to combat the 
limitations of an eventual low response rate to the survey. Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 403) also 
note that a triangulation of interviews and survey can enhance the credibility of a study. If 
similar results are reached in both of our data collection methods this may therefore have a 
positive effect on the credibility of our research leading to an enhanced trustworthiness. 
 
Due to the limited time scope of this thesis, the data collection methods was conducted 
simultaneously. These methods are considered as complements to each other were one 
alleviates the weaknesses of the other and vice versa. The data collection methods were thereby 
not selected on the premise that one is only supposed to strengthen the results of a main method, 
and we consider them as equally important in order to answer our research questions. Although 
these data collection methods were conducted in parallel, they will be presented separately 
below to give a better overview.  
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2.5 Interviews 
Representatives from the key Swedish stakeholder groups have been interviewed to obtain 
experience based information. These interviews can thus be identified as systematizing expert 
interviews. According to Bogner et al. (2009, pp. 46-47), the focus of such interviews is to 
obtain exclusive knowledge of experience that the interviewee possesses. To obtain such 
experience based knowledge is also the objective of all conducted interviews, although not all 
interviewees may be regarded as experts. Furthermore, the aim of systematizing expert 
interviews is to collect data that is comparable (Bogner et al., 2009, p. 47), which is also in line 
with a positivist spirit in qualitative research (Power and Gendron, 2015, p. 154). This naturally 
has an effect on the design of our interview guides.  
 
The collection of easily comparable data would certainly be facilitated by conducting structured 
interviews with a set research guide of detailed questions to which no deviations are allowed 
(Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 474). According to Power and Gendron (2015, p. 154) this is also 
most common in studies of a positivist spirit. However, we believe that an important element 
in the interview process is to allow the respondents to elaborate their thoughts, making it 
necessary to allow the interview to develop in somewhat different directions. Therefore, we 
regard the semi-structured interview as most suitable for this thesis. In a semi-structured 
interview, the interviewer follows a detailed interview guide of questions but it is allowed to 
stray from the ordering of these and ask follow-up questions if something sparks the 
interviewers interest (Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 475). While the use of semi-structured 
interviews is not mentioned by Power and Gendron (2015) when discussing a qualitative 
research of a positivist spirit, it is to our understanding that such interviews can be conducted 
to collect comparable data as well. 
 
2.5.1 Development of interview guides 
To mitigate the risk of collecting data that is difficult to compare, interview guides are 
developed with similar questions to all respondents. However, as a natural consequence of 
having diverse groups of respondents with different background and knowledge, some 
questions have been developed specifically to the different stakeholder groups. One example of 
this is the interviews with the CFOs of listed companies. While some had the experience of 
long working relationships with their auditors, others had experience with the process of 
changing audit firm. Since we were interested to find out more about these experiences, the 
questions asked differed slightly. Furthermore, we allowed the conversation to progress 
naturally and the exact order of questions in our interview guide was therefore not maintained 
in all interviews.  
 
The questions of our interview guide was developed with basis in the EU audit regulation of 
auditor independence, particularly the measures of mandatory audit firm rotation and 
prohibition of non-audit services. However, when gaining additional insights during the 
interview process, some questions were added to obtain the opinions of other respondents on 
those matters. The interview guides can be found in the appendix 1. 
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2.5.2 Conducting interviews 
As evident from the table below detailing our interviews, some interviews were conducted over 
the telephone. There are a few disadvantages of performing telephone interviews, including that 
it is easier for the respondent to finish the interview prematurely, the lacking ability to read the 
respondents body-language, and finally, technical issues such as bad phone reception (Bryman 
& Bell, 2013, p. 495). It is to our understanding that during the later stages of our data collection 
process, it was also necessary to conduct interviews over the telephone to persuade respondents 
to participate with shorter notice. We believe this enabled us to conduct more interviews than 
we would have if keeping to personal interviews.  
 
Interviewee Type of interview Time 
   
Financial market actors   
Secretary general of the 
Swedish Society of Financial 
Analysts, Nils Liliedahl 
Telephone 21 minutes 
Fund Manager Telephone 18 minutes 
Director of market 
surveillance of the Swedish 
Shareholder’s Association, 
Albin Rännar 
Telephone 44 minutes 
   
Public Interest entities   
CFO CellaVision In person 24 minutes 
CFO Active BioTech In person 38 minutes 
CFO Probi AB In person 44 minutes 
Expert in accounting of the 
Confederation of Swedish 
enterprise, Claes Norberg 
Telephone 34 minutes 
   
The Audit profession   
Audit partner of PwC In person 29 minutes 
Audit partner of PwC In person 27 minutes 
Audit partner of PwC In person 24 minutes 
Audit partner of KPMG In person 32 minutes 
Audit partner of Grant 
Thornton 
Telephone 20 minutes 
Chief legal counsel of 
Swedish Institute of 
Authorised Public 
Accountants and partaking in 
the Swedish assessment of 
the reform, Helene Agélii 
Telephone 28 minutes 
Figure 2.3: table of conducted interviews 
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Of all the disadvantages of performing telephone interviews, the only one being noticeable to 
us was the technical issues. In some instances, bad telephone connection led to some difficulties 
hearing the answers clearly on the voice recorder in the subsequent transcription process. 
However, this has not been considered any significant issue and we still believe that the benefits 
of telephone interviews outweighed the disadvantages in our case. The concern of being unable 
to read the respondents body-language was not prominent to us as we did not intend to extend 
the analysis in that direction. Moreover, as evident from the table showing time spent on each 
interview, our telephone interviews do not differ significantly in time from those performed in 
person. The average interview time of all interviews were 29 minutes. Some interviews 
conducted over the telephone were shorter than the average, but some also surpassed this time 
significantly. It is to our belief that the time of our interviews was more determined by the 
interviewees interest in the research topic than anything else. In the longer interviews the 
respondents were eager to share their opinions and experiences while in some of the shorter 
interviews the respondents were less interested. 
 
The selection of respondents was mainly driven by the experience driven knowledge they were 
assumed to possess. In some cases, we found that the knowledge we wanted to acquire was only 
present in that specific individual, explaining why we chose to conduct telephone interviews 
with respondents in varying locations. Since some of the stakeholder groups have large and 
outspread populations, we chose to contact individuals located in the southern parts of Sweden, 
mainly the cities of Lund and Malmö. The choice to contact potential interviewees in these 
areas was partially driven by convenience, but we also noticed that individuals in these areas 
were more willing to contribute to our thesis because of the local connection to Lund university. 
To exemplify, one stakeholder group was first contacted without consideration of location, 
receiving no responses. When we eventually refocused our endeavors to Malmö and Lund, the 
response rate was significantly improved. 
 
When conducting the interviews, we were aware of the phenomenon of ‘social desirability’, i.e. 
that respondents answer questions in a way that they think will reflect nicely on them (Bryman 
& Bell, 2013, p. 241). Such behaviour could result in the interviewees not divulging their actual 
perceptions if they, for some reason, believe that another answer is more socially desirable. The 
different professions may also have an interest in maintaining the image of that profession and 
therefore answer questions with careful considerations. Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 242) 
mentions that one way of reducing this behaviour is to ask questions in a way that allows the 
respondent to distance themselves from the answer, by for example asking how a colleague 
would act. Similarly, we allowed the respondents to answer questions in general terms when 
they seemed to be flustered on how to answer. However, such a measure would naturally not 
be able to mitigate the risk of wanting to maintain the image of the profession. Another measure 
taken to reduce this kind of behavior was to only send the interviewees a topic guide before the 
interview. This served as an assurance that no socially desirable answers had been prepared in 
advance. If such tendencies made it into the answers despite these measures they arguably 
constitute a limitation but according to Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 242), one should not be 
overwhelmed by this phenomenon as it is unknown how common it is. The risk of these 
tendencies in our collected interview data will of course be considered in the data analysis.  
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In an attempt to strengthen the credibility of this study, respondent validation has been 
performed to confirm the correctness of the data (Bryman & Bell, p. 403). This means that the 
interviewees of this study was sent quote checks for approval.  
 
2.5.3 Interview data analysis 
All interviews were recorded and transcriptions were made. As all interviews were performed 
in Swedish, the native language of the respondents, complete transcriptions of these interviews 
are deemed to be unnecessary to include in this thesis. Rather segments regarded as important 
for the analysis will be translated and presented. To only include relevant passages is also most 
common according to Bogner et al. (2009, p. 35). This does not, on the other hand, mean that 
parts of the interview data are left outside the analysis as the complete transcriptions have been 
uploaded into the qualitative data analysis programme Nvivo. This programme allowed the 
researchers to more effectively perform a coding of the interview data (Bryman and Bell, 2013, 
p. 594). According to Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 579), coding is the process of breaking data 
into smaller pieces and naming them. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Example of Nvivo coding 
 
When the interview data was being processed and coded it was necessary to determine areas of 
focus for the subsequent analysis. In order to decide the key aspects, the research questions 
were used as basis. Nine codes were then formulated and used to analyses how the interviewees 
responded to the different elements of the reform and the assumptions on which it has been 
developed on. When the coding was completed, the process of detecting trends and 
contradictions between the interview subjects was the next step. This process has been 
conducted with an objective eye, which has been perceived crucial for the conformity aspect of 
trustworthiness in this thesis and in keeping with the positivist spirit.   
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2.6 Survey 
The aim of this thesis is also to conduct a survey study into the perceptions of auditor 
independence of the groups defined as key stakeholders. The survey was intended to reach far 
more of the individuals of the key stakeholder populations and enable us to say something about 
the perceptions of the group as a whole. However, as will be discussed under limitations below, 
the results of our survey will only serve as an indication of the perceptions of these groups as 
we struggled to secure a sufficient amount of participants. This is not uncommon for qualitative 
studies with a positivist spirit as Power and Gendron (2015) explain that even though the aim 
of such studies is to be generalizable this is hard to achieve due to the constraint that only a 
limited amount of observations can be made.  
 
2.6.1 Development of survey questions 
A low response rate is also one of the most important limitations of a survey study according 
to Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 248). As we are fully aware that the individuals of our key 
stakeholder groups are people with hectic work schedules, this was taken into consideration 
when developing and distributing our survey. One group in particular are notorious for having 
a massive workload especially during this time of the year, namely auditors. Therefore, we 
wanted to keep the amount of questions at a minimum to motivate these to take the time to 
respond. Much like the interview guides discussed above, some questions were added that were 
specific for the stakeholder group the survey was designed for. For example, in regard to 
financial market actors we wanted to know if they included the independence of auditors when 
evaluating an investment. In order to enable comparisons most questions included in the 
different surveys were standardized and thus asked in all surveys. 
 
Bryman and Bell (2013, pp. 249-250) describe several measures to increase the response rate 
of a survey, measures which have all been considered in developing this survey. First, we have 
kept the survey as short as possible and the different stakeholder surveys contain 5-7 questions. 
Moreover, Bryman and Bell (2013) state that the survey should also have as few open questions 
as possible because the requirement to write many comments may discourage respondents from 
answering. Out of our five standardized questions only one is open, namely the concluding 
question opening up for respondents to share other thoughts about the topic. In that commentary 
respondents are free to elaborate on their answers in the closed questions if they feel the need 
or desire to do so. The standardized questions can be found in appendix 2 and include both 
yes/no questions and questions with a likert scale. As with our interview questions the main 
inspiration for the questions asked were the EU audit regulation in regard to the independence 
measures. 
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The first two questions were designed to determine the different stakeholder groups´ opinion 
of the measures imposed by the EU. The purpose of question three was instead to make the 
respondents reveal their standpoint in regard to audit tenure and NAS. These questions will give 
us the opportunity to determine if and to what degree the different stakeholders perceive auditor 
independence to be threatened by audit tenure and NAS. Moreover, we included a statement 
about partner rotation to see if the different stakeholders perceived a difference between the 
independence of the audit firm and the individual auditor. Question four lists the different non-
audit services prohibited by the EU and has the purpose of determining the stakeholder groups 
perceptions about their auditor independence impairing effects.  
 
How respondents are contacted is also of importance to enhance the possibilities to receive 
responses to the survey (Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 249). Therefore, careful considerations have 
been made on the wording of the introduction mail to motivate respondents to help with our 
research. The purpose of the study has been explained and respondents have been made aware 
that their answers are completely anonymous. We believe that this may also help in combating 
the phenomenon of social desirability discussed above, although Bryman and Bell claim that 
such behavior is less prominent in surveys (2013, p. 247). The introduction letter is also 
addressed so that the respondent gets the impression that it is directed to them personally and 
the letter is signed with the researchers’ names. According to Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 250) 
this may enhance the response rate. 
 
2.6.2 Respondents and response rate 
The respondents to our survey were at large determined by the identified key stakeholder groups 
for which it was possible to collect a sufficient number of email addresses to. A great effort was 
put into searching for contact details and to begin with the aim was to encompass all identified 
stakeholders. However, limitations were detected as it proved difficult to access email addresses 
to members of companies’ board of directors and nomination committees. Therefore, the only 
representative from the key stakeholder group of listed companies are members of the top 
management. Contact information to CFOs and CEOs of Swedish listed companies were 
gathered by following lists of all such companies (Affärsvärlden, 2016a; Affärsvärlden, 2016b; 
Affärsvärlden, 2016c) and searching for information on those companies’ web pages. This 
resulted in a list of 333 CFOs and CEOs that were all sent the survey. According to a recent 
study, there are 275 listed companies in Sweden (The AllBright report, 2016). The population 
of CFOs and CEOs may thus be assumed to be 550 individuals and we were hence able to reach 
approximately 60 percent of this population. 
 
In regard to the stakeholder group of auditors we also searched for contact details for authorized 
auditors on the web. According to the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (2015) there 
were 3495 authorized Swedish auditors in the end of 2015, and of these we were able to gather 
665 email addresses, making our sample of this population 19 percent. It would have been 
possible to collect contact information for a larger fraction of this population, but since this task 
is highly time-consuming, we decided to limit these efforts at this point. Furthermore, the 
survey was sent to auditors of all the prominent audit firms in Sweden, i.e. PwC, KPMG, E&Y, 
Deloitte, Grant Thornton, BDO and Mazars SET and were collected from offices in the three 
Swedish metropolitan regions Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö.  
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The contact information gathered for the financial analysts was retrieved from public online 
lists of analysts following Swedish listed companies. This process resulted in a total list of 111 
email addresses, and if one could regard the members of the Swedish Society of Financial 
Analysts as a rough estimate of population, this would represent 10 percent of the population. 
Further, by searching the webpages of Swedish fund companies we were able to gather a list of 
65 fund managers. 
 
Private investors were much more difficult to reach, our initial plan was to gain the assistance 
of the Swedish Association of Shareholders and to send our survey to a sample of their 
members. However, this turned out to be impossible. Therefore, we proceeded to another plan 
which was to spread the survey on forums for private investors. This means that we have no 
way of knowing how many private investors that were reached by the survey. As will be 
discussed below we recognize that this is one of the biggest limitations of our thesis.  
 
The surveys to corporate management, auditors, financial analysts and fund managers were sent 
out on a Monday morning. When we sent out reminders the following Wednesday morning, 4 
percent of auditors had responded, 20,7 percent of top management, 11,7 percent of financial 
analysts and 6,15 percent of fund managers. Much like Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 249) claims, 
reminders do work and the response rates were subsequently improved to the following: 
 
Stakeholder Sample Respondents Response rate 
Auditors 665 40 6 percent 
Top management 333 80 24 percent 
Financial analysts 111 16 14,4 percent 
Fund managers 65 12 18,5 percent 
Figure 2.5: Sample and response rates for auditors, top management, financial analysts and fund 
managers 
 
Bryman and Bell (2013, p. 249) recommended that reminders be sent out two weeks after the 
initial distribution. Partially driven by the limited time scope of this thesis, we sent out a 
reminder after two days. We do not, however, believe that this was a disadvantage as we noticed 
that most of the replies came directly after the respondents received the survey, with nearly no 
responses the following day. The short timespan between the first distribution and the reminder 
also means that the survey was fresh in the consciousness of those that had not yet responded 
and we believe that this is the reason behind our significant increase of response rate, 
particularly in regard to the for fund managers. 
 
The response rate of all of our stakeholder groups would thus be deemed unacceptable in 
accordance to Mangione’s categorisation of response rates (as referred to in Bryman & Bell, 
2013, p. 249). It is therefore important to note that we only regard this data as an indication as 
we cannot assure that the responses are representative for the population. Unfortunately, our 
efforts of reaching private shareholders was not very fruitful either, only resulting in thirteen 
responses.  
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2.6.3 Survey data analysis 
In keeping with our positivist spirit the main objective of the survey analysis is to make 
comparisons and to present the data in numerical terms. As the standard deviation can be used 
as a measure of the degree of variation in the answers (Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 352) this value 
will allow us to determine how much the respondents agreed in the different questions. That 
means that questions with a low standard deviation is more likely to give a good indication of 
the perceptions of the stakeholder group. In combination with the median the standard deviation 
will therefore be presented in the analysis as an indication of the agreement within the 
stakeholder groups. The median may also be perceived as a rough estimation of the average 
perceptions in that stakeholder group. In the questions of a likert scale the answer options have 
been assigned a number from 1-5 were 1 represents strongly agree, 3 is neutral and 5 represents 
strongly disagree. That the average perception in a group is agreeing with an assertion may thus 
be indicated when the median is below 3 and vice versa. However, the median is not regarded 
to be a strong indication of the perceptions of the stakeholder groups and must therefore be 
analyzed in combination with the standard deviation and the percentage of each answer option.  
 
In the presentation of the survey findings, some of the comments given by the respondents are 
also included. We have, however, refrained from providing deep analyzes these as it is 
important to remain objective and the reader is therefore allowed to make their own judgement 
of the presented comments.  
 
Moreover, the correlation between the different question answers will be calculated using 
Spearman’s rank correlation (ρ). This correlation will serve as a basis for an analysis of the 
connection between different questions. As this survey contains questions of diverse scales it 
would be unsuitable to correlate using Pearsons r (Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 352) and correlation 
will instead be calculated on the ranks of answers. This calculation will be performed in excel 
using the following formula (Djurfeldt et al., 2010, p. 150): 
 
𝜌 = 1 −  
6 ∑ 𝑑2
𝑛(𝑛2 − 1)
 
 
Where d is the difference between two ranks and n is the number of observations. The rank has 
been established using the function RANK.AVG in excel in which answers of the same value 
is ranked with the average. The process of calculating Spearman’s rank correlation is depicted 
in the table below.  
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var3 var4 rank3 rank4 d d^2
4 4 3,5 6 -2,5 6,25
2 3 11,5 8,5 3 9
2 5 11,5 3 8,5 72,25
2 2 11,5 12,5 -1 1
3 2 6 12,5 -6,5 42,25
5 5 1,5 3 -1,5 2,25
4 5 3,5 3 0,5 0,25
2 5 11,5 3 8,5 72,25
2 3 11,5 8,5 3 9
2 2 11,5 12,5 -1 1
2 2 11,5 12,5 -1 1
0 0 16 15,5 0,5 0,25
5 3 1,5 8,5 -7 49
3 3 6 8,5 -2,5 6,25
3 5 6 3 3 9
2 0 11,5 15,5 -4 16
297
6∑d^2 1782
n(n^2-1) 4080
Divided 0,436765
ρ 0,563235
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Example of the calculations of Spearman’s rank correlation in excel 
 
2.7 Ethical considerations 
When conducting our research, we have followed the research ethical principles of 
Vetenskapsrådet, a Swedish authority under the ministry of education and research. This code 
contains four ethical demands on research which can be translated into English as the 
information demand, the consent demand, the confidentiality demand and the utilization 
demand. 
 
The first demand is that the respondent shall be informed about their participation and that they 
participate on a voluntary basis (Vetenskapsrådet, 2002, p. 7). As a part of meeting this demand 
all interviews and the introduction letter of the survey opened with a description of the purpose 
of this thesis.  Moreover, the purpose of the thesis was also presented when establishing contact 
with the interviewees. The second demand, the consent demand, means that all respondents 
must be given the opportunity to agree or disagree to participate in the study (Vetenskapsrådet, 
2002, p. 9). Naturally we did not force participation and was clear in all our communications 
with eventual respondents that they were completely free to decline. According to 
Vetenskapsrådet it is not necessary to collect consent before a survey is sent out, and by 
providing the purpose of the research as discussed above, consent can be said to be given when 
responses are sent back. Participants in both interviews and the survey study were, of course, 
free to terminate their participation at any time.  
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Further, the confidentiality demand states that individuals should not be able to be identified 
through the information presented or by obtaining other details about the individuals stored by 
the researchers (Vetenskapsrådet, 2002, p. 12). This demand is perhaps most prominent in the 
cases where our participants have responded that they wish to remain anonymous. In order to 
secure their identity from being revealed we have therefore kept the describing attributes to a 
minimum. Of course, no information about respondents was shared to outside parties in any 
way, shape or form. Finally, the utilization demand states that information about participants 
may only be used for research (Vetenskapsrådet, 2002, p. 14).  
 
In this thesis we have also followed the recommendations of Vetenskapsrådet (2002, p. 15) and 
sent a quote check to all interviewees for approval before publication. According to Bryman 
and Bell (2013, p. 137), other ethical codes for research usually contains the four demands 
discussed above. However, they also note a fifth common demand, namely that the researchers 
should not give the participants false or misleading information about the study. All participants 
of this study has been informed that the purpose of the study is to investigate the perceptions of 
auditor independence of different groups, and no attempts have thus been made to deceive the 
respondents.  
 
2.8 Limitations 
We recognize two major limitations in the conduction of this thesis. First, for various reasons 
we were unable to encompass all of the key Swedish stakeholders. As mentioned above contact 
information to members of the board of directors and nomination committees were scares and 
we were thus unable to send a survey to this group. However, when trying to contact those few 
individuals for which contact details were available in the hope of an interview no interest in 
participation was found. Since we were unable to include board members nor management in 
the banking industry, the top management in this study are thus all from listed companies.  
 
All other identified key stakeholders have been included in this research either through the 
survey, interviews or a combination of the two. Unfortunately, it proved to be impossible to 
persuade a private investor to participate in an interview as these claimed to have too little 
knowledge about the topic. Therefore, the interview with the chief of market surveillance of the 
Swedish Shareholder’s Association is the only representative of this group in the interview data. 
This is especially unfortunate since the survey responses from this group was limited. However, 
it is to our understanding that the chief of market surveillance, Albin Rännar, is a good source 
of knowledge about private investors, being in frequent contact with the members of the 
Swedish Shareholder’s Association.  
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A low response rate to our survey is naturally the second big limitation of this study and it was 
especially difficult to motivate capital market actors to responding. In part we suspect that the 
low rate could be explained by the perception of auditor independence as a rather insignificant 
issue, especially for the financial market actors. This was also suggested by the interviewed 
capital market actors and various such individuals when refusing to participate in interviews. 
Moreover, in regard to private investors, we believe that the survey could have attained a better 
response rate, but that the significant loss may derive from these being unacquainted with the 
research topic and thus unmotivated to contribute. In hindsight we believe that the process of 
designing and distributing this survey should have been even more carefully thought through 
and perhaps an included explanation of the term auditor independence could have increased the 
response rate somewhat.  
 
2.9 Chapter summary 
This thesis is based upon a qualitative research method with a tendency towards a positivist 
spirit. A triangulation of data collection methods has been conducted in order to achieve both 
breadth and depth and furthermore strengthen the subsequent findings of the study. Although 
the research method chosen has a number of limitations, mostly deriving from respondents 
being reluctant to participate, we believe that such a triangulation of interview data and survey 
data will give us the ability to answer our research questions. 
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3. Auditing 
3.1 The audit function 
According to Hayes et al. (2014, pp. 10-11), the audit function involves the evaluation of 
information and assertions from a company in regard to their reliability. Moreover, the auditor 
shall also evaluate if the financial statements have been prepared in accordance to applicable 
regulations and standards. The role of the auditor is thus to provide an expert opinion on the 
reliability of financial statements and this function is claimed to be important to increase the 
confidence of investors (Hayes et al., 2014, p. 43). When conducting an audit, the auditor is 
only responsible for finding material misstatements, i.e. those that may affect decisions taken 
with the statements as a basis (Hayes et al., 2014, p. 12).  
 
An audit engagement is often conducted in teams where the opinion given by the partner is 
based upon the work of other employees of the audit firm and according to Herrbach (2001), 
these team members have a large impact on audit quality. Professional scepticism is also 
regarded to be important to reduce the risk of audit failure and according to a study by Payne 
and Ramsay (2005) these other team members might even be more sceptical towards the 
truthfulness of financial statements.  
 
3.2 Auditor independence 
Limperg (1985) developed a dynamic theory on the link between the society´s need for reliable 
financial information and the methods in which auditors use to meet such needs. At the centre 
of his work is the social responsibility of the independent auditor, and the author emphasizes 
that the confidence society places in the effectiveness of an audit is the condition for the 
existence of the audit function. Flint (1988) identifies seven basic postulates to map the 
foundation of auditing. The importance of audit independence is stressed in the third postulate, 
stating that in order for any parties to have confidence in the audit report, the auditor must not 
only be independent, but also be seen as independent. The auditor must therefore be free of 
direction, influence, intimidation and economic interest. 
 
Independent auditors are also claimed to play an essential role in a corporate governance system 
in providing reassurance to external parties about the correctness of the financial reports 
prepared by managers and directors (Tricker, 2012, pp. 479-481). In order to fulfil this role, 
Tricker states that it is important that auditors remain independent from the company, which 
can be challenging due to the fact that auditors have frequent contact with management. The 
need for auditor independence can therefore be seen to be connected to the concern that 
individuals are self-interested and that managers having the control of the company would use 
this power to the disadvantage of owners (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
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Many definitions of auditor independence are based upon the concern that auditors may be 
influenced by the self-interest of management. Nichols and Price (1976) connected auditor 
independence to the ability to resist management pressure while Watts and Zimmerman (1979) 
identified it as the propensity to report detected breaches. Similarly, Antle (1984) claimed that 
auditors cannot be regarded to be independent if they collude with management. DeAngelo 
(1981) emphasized the importance of auditor independence, stating that it serves as a 
fundamental cornerstone for the level of audit quality. She argued that the quality of auditing is 
determined by the probability that the auditor will report violations or findings that are not in 
line with the national GAAP, and concluded that this probability will decline if the auditor lacks 
independence and objectivity. The academic definition of auditor independence can thus be 
claimed to revolve around the resistance to management pressure. 
 
When discussing auditor independence, Antle (1984) assumes that, much like management, 
auditors are also affected by self-interest. This indicates that an auditor would act independently 
and report all breaches only when this option pays more than the opposite. One way that 
management could make it worthwhile for auditors to deviate from the righteous path is to make 
side-payments, and Antle even believes that the debate over Management Advisory Services 
has its origin in the concern that managers could use these services as a way to pay off their 
auditors. However, Antle also notes that collusion could have a negative effect in the long run 
as the auditor might incur a bad reputation leading to lost clients. From this viewpoint, 
maintaining independence would be in the auditor’s self-interest as it could be essential for the 
ability for the going concern of the firm. 
 
3.3 Previous research of auditor independence in mind 
3.3.1 Audit tenure 
The auditor-client relationship is a recurring concern when discussing the independence of the 
auditor and has been highlighted by both regulators and standard-setters as a potential threat. 
Bamber and Iyer (2007) emphasized the difficult balance in this relationship, arguing that in 
order to conduct a good audit, the auditor must know and understand the client and their 
business. Instead of examining the auditor independence from a financial perspective, Bamber 
and Iyer investigated the auditor behaviour from a social perspective. The findings suggested 
that the auditors do relate to their clients, however, with significant variations depending on the 
level of experience and professionalism. The findings suggest that client identification could 
compromise the objectiveness of the auditor, and furthermore reduce the level of critical 
judgement by acquiescing certain client-preferred solutions. The results thereby confirmed the 
regulators´ concern that client identification could compromise the level of independence. 
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Studying long audit tenure in Belgium Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) did not find evidence 
that the independence of auditors was impaired as the propensity to issue going concern audit 
opinions was not influenced. On the other hand, their results did not show that audit quality 
benefited from long tenure either, as auditors did not get better at distinguishing struggling 
companies over time. Conducting a similar study in the U.S Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) 
found the opposite, as they argued against mandatory audit firm rotation. They found evidence 
that audit reporting failures were more prominent the first years of an audit tenure and that the 
auditor was thus better equipped to audit a company after a longer relationship. Their results 
were also supported by research conducted by Johnson et al. (2002). Even though neither of 
these studies referred to auditor independence they indicate that audit tenure has little impact 
on auditor independence as defined as the propensity to report all breaches. 
 
Further, when examining the suitability of audit firm rotation in combating impaired auditor 
independence Carcello and Nagy (2004) came to a negative conclusion. They studied the 
relationship between audit tenure and fraudulent financial reporting, but found that this was 
more likely to appear in the beginning of an auditor-client relationship. 
 
Frequent contact with the accounting and finance department of a client company was found to 
be a possible threat to auditor independence in a Swedish study by Hellman (2006). He 
suggested that the auditor could have been too dependent on this department as the management 
letter, which otherwise contained no praise, included many positive comments about the 
accounting and finance department and no criticism. In his case study this department was also 
in charge of all fee negotiations and thus in effect remunerated the auditor.   
 
3.3.2 Non-audit services 
According to Defond et al. (2002), the prohibition of NAS in the Sarbanes-Oxley act was based 
on the assumption that auditors are ready to compromise their independence if it leads to clients 
buying additional non audit services (NAS). They conducted empirical research into the impact 
of NAS fees on auditor independence and found this assumption to be groundless as no 
significant association was detected between NAS and going concern audit opinions. Kinney et 
al. (2004) also conducted empirical research to evaluate the assumption that NAS impair 
independence by investigating the relationship between NAS fees and restatements. A positive 
association between these was stated to indicate that independence was damaged whereas a 
negative relationship could even indicate that NAS improves the audit quality because the 
auditor has more information about the company. In regard to unspecified non-audit services, 
where the authors did not know what the services actually consisted of, a positive association 
was found giving support to the notion that NAS could impair independence. On the other hand, 
they also found that tax service fees had a negative association with restatements. This was 
stated to suggest that any potential independence impairing effects of these fees were 
compensated by increased audit quality. According to this research a ban on tax services could 
therefore have negative consequences on audit quality that the enhanced independence cannot 
make up for. 
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In Australia, Craswell (1999) did not find any evidence that NAS impair auditor independence 
as the decision to give a qualified audit opinion did not appear to be influenced by this. Another 
Australian study by Sharma and Sidhu (2001) found that auditors are influenced by the 
economic dependency on NAS provision in issuing going concern audit opinions. However, in 
New Zealand Hay et al. (2006) found the opposite as NAS provision did not appear to have an 
impact on the auditor’s propensity to issue qualified opinions. Ruddock et al. (2006) argued 
that news-based conservatism, i.e. a reduction of the timeliness of bad news being reflected in 
earnings, could be an indicator of impaired auditor independence, but did not find any associate 
between this and NAS. They therefore concluded that the prohibition of NAS in the U.S was 
unlikely to enhance auditor independence in mind.   
 
Studies into auditor independence in mind has thus reached differing results, where some 
suggests that NAS and long audit tenure has a negative effect and others the contrary. 
 
3.4 Previous research of auditor independence in appearance 
Flint (1988) argues that what society accepts tend to form the development of audit practices 
and how different individuals perceive auditor independence is therefore of importance. 
Furthermore, Mautz (1975) states that the auditing practice is a socially constructed 
phenomenon, and that the role of the auditor is continuously modified by the dynamics of  
social norms and requirements indicating that when society changes auditing practices will 
follow. The auditor independence in appearance is thus of great importance and studies 
investigating this will be presented below. These studies are also of the highest relevance to this 
thesis as it will provide similar results. 
 
Auditor independence in appearance has been studied extensively in the past. These studies can 
be divided into two groups with different approaches, archival data studies based on capital 
market reactions and survey studies. 
 
3.4.1 Market reactions 
Audit tenure 
Audit tenure and rotation was investigated by Azizkhani et al. (2006) and Ghosh and Moon 
(2005). Both of these studies came to the conclusion that investors do not perceive audit firm 
tenure as a significant threat to the audit quality. Azizkhani et al. (2006) also found that 
Australian investors were not influenced by audit partner rotation. In a Taiwan study the 
opposite was found as the findings of Chi et al. (2005) suggested that Taiwan investors became 
more confident in auditor independence after partner rotation became mandatory. They 
examined market reactions to audit partner rotation before and after it was required by law, 
providing results that suggested that the positive reactions to voluntary partner rotation were 
lower than the reactions to mandatory rotation. This indicated that the new regulation had drawn 
attention to the potential impact of long audit-client relationships, influencing the perceptions 
of investors. 
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Non-audit services 
The issue of Management advisory services (MAS) and non-audit services (NAS) has been the 
focus of many studies, but the results have varied significantly. Already in 1985, Glezen and 
Millar investigated how disclosures of non-audit fees affected investors decisions. In 1978 it 
had become mandatory for public companies in the U.S to include information about non-audit 
fees in their financial statements and investors therefore, for the first time, had the opportunity 
to use such information in their decision-making. Glezen and Millar (1985) studied auditor-
approval ratios as they believed that investors would become more sceptical of the auditors but 
did not find that these had altered significantly, leading to the conclusion that investors did not 
perceive auditor independence differently. They also examined if the type of non-audit service 
impacted the auditor-approval rations and for one of the two years studied found that services 
related to taxes affected the investors negatively. This indicates that investors may perceive 
these services as a threat to auditor independence. 
 
The requirement to include fee information in financial statements was removed in 1982 
because the SEC did not believe that the information was used by investors (Glezen & Millar, 
1985). As a consequence of the the substantial growth in the non-audit industries during the 
1990s, SEC saw a renewed need for expanded regulation mandating fee disclosures (Francis & 
Ke, 2006). The 2001 regulation triggered a new wave of studies and research on the impact 
disclosure levels may have on auditor independence (e.g. Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Krishnan et al., 
2005; Francis & Ke, 2006; Khurana & Raman, 2006; Lai & Krishnan, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2009). 
Negative market reactions to non-audit fees was found by Krishnan et al. (2005) and Francis 
and Ke (2006) who both studied the earnings response coefficient. When using cumulative 
abnormal returns, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) came to another conclusion as they did not find a 
significant change. Furthermore, Lai & Krishnan (2009) even found that NAS fees could have 
a positive effect, depending on the services provided. Their results suggested that the provision 
of financial information system services by auditors were so valuable to the company that it 
outweighed any concerns about the auditor’s independence. Therefore, the impact NAS may 
have on auditor independence in appearance in the US remain unclear. Further, in an Australian 
study by Gul et al. (2006), support was given to the notion that NAS have a negative influence 
on the perceptions of auditor independence. 
 
Krishnan et al. (2005) also concluded that investors did not appear to be concerned about high 
audit fees. On the contrary Ghosh et al. (2009) found that it was the audit firm’s dependence on 
audit fees that impaired independence in appearance. Moreover, the study by Khurana & Raman 
(2006) found that the perception of auditor independence is impaired by both audit and non-
audit fees. 
 
It is thus not possible to determine how investors are affected by NAS and audit tenure based 
on previous archival data studies of market reactions. These studies show large variations in 
results which may be related to the research design. For example, it was noticed by Ashbaugh 
et al. (2003) that the factors influencing market reactions are numerous. 
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3.4.2 Survey studies of the perceptions of auditor independence 
Whereas the market reaction studies above can only investigate the capital market actors 
perceptions´of auditor independence in appearance, survey studies can be designed to 
investigate the perceptions of multiple groups. In the beginning, these studies were concentrated 
to Anglo-Saxon countries such as the U.S and the UK (e.g. Firth, 1980; Schleifer & Shockley, 
1990; Bartlett, 1993), but more recent studies have expanded the research to continental 
European countries such as Germany and Denmark as well (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 
2015; Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no 
previous survey study has been conducted in Sweden and the perception of Swedish 
stakeholders therefore remain uncertain. 
 
Some of these studies have compared the perceptions of different groups. In the UK, Firth 
(1980) found that those that used financial statements thought that auditors were not 
independent in more circumstances than auditors. That auditors have a different view on 
independence than other groups were also found in the studies of Bartlett (1993), Beattie et al. 
(1999), Quick & Warming-Rasmussen (2005) and Shockley (1981). Another group that was 
found to perceive fewer threats to auditor independence was managing directors of companies 
issuing financial statements (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). Although managing 
directors were also found to be more skeptical of the auditors’ ability to remain independent 
than the auditors. Additionally, Beattie et al. (1999) also sent out a survey to finance directors 
in companies and found a difference in perceptions. These two studies are among few studies 
to our knowledge that have investigated the perceptions of those that prepare financial 
statements. 
 
Audit tenure 
Long before the financial crisis Firth (1980) found that the perception of auditor independence 
was insignificantly affected by long relationships. Respondents were asked to judge if an 
auditor that had worked with the same client for more than ten years was still independent and 
between 78-94 percent of all groups responded positively. In another pre-crisis study Shockley 
(1981) also found an insignificant effect of long relationships, suggesting that audit tenure was 
not viewed as a threat at that time. More recently the impact of audit tenure on the perception 
of auditor independence has been investigated by Daniels and Booker (2011), Gates et al. 
(2007) and Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) in the US as well as by Dart (2011) in UK. Daniels and 
Booker (2011) found that bank loan officers perceived auditor independence to be strengthened 
when a company had a policy of rotating audit firms. However, they did not find a significant 
difference in the perception of independence when an audit firm conducted their first audit of a 
company in comparison to the sixth one. Moreover, they did not find evidence that bank loan 
officers questioned the audit quality when they thought that auditors were dependent due to 
long relationships, indicating that this did not impact their decisions. Both Gates et al. (2007) 
and Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) studied the perceptions of business students. While Kaplan and 
Mauldin (2008) found that students were unaffected by long audit partner as well as audit firm 
relationships, the study by Gates et al. (2008) suggests that perceptions of auditor independence 
are enhanced by audit firm rotation.  
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According to Dart (2011), the provision of NAS and economic dependency are perceived as far 
greater threats than lengthy relationships. When institutional investors in the UK were being 
asked if a relationship of more than five years was a threat to auditor independence, these mostly 
disagreed as only 18 percent found this statement to be true. The percentage of private investors 
that found this to be a threat was slightly bigger at 26,4 percent, but the majority still disagreed 
or was neutral. Moreover, Dart (2011) found that the majority of both institutional and private 
investors believe that partner rotation is enough to protect auditor independence. The opinions 
on mandatory audit firm rotation were more varied as the majority of institutional investors did 
not welcome the regulation, while 49,4 percent of the private investors thought it would be good 
to implement it. 
 
Non-audit services 
In regard to the provision of NAS, Dart (2011) found that 42,9 percent of institutional investors 
and 42,1 percent of private investors believed that an auditors independence was impaired when 
NAS was also provided to an audit client. However, her results also showed that the majority 
of both groups did not think that the provision of NAS should be banned altogether, but that 
audit personnel should not be allowed to provide it. Many other studies have found that users 
of financial statements perceive the provision of NAS as a threat to auditor independence (e.g. 
Schleifer & Shockley, 1990; Bartlett, 1993; Beattie et al., 1999; Canning & Gwilliam, 1999; 
Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Colbert et al., 2008; Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 
2015; Shockley, 1981; Lowe et al., 1999; Swanger & Chewing, 2001; Quick & Warming-
Rasmussen, 2009). On the contrary, when conducting a study of the perception of bankers in 
New Zealand, Gul (1989) found that the perception of auditor independence was strengthened 
when the audit firm also provided the client with Management advisory services. When 
attempting to explain this result, Gul referred to a study by Coreless and Parker (1987) which 
suggested that auditors came to question clients they also consulted to a larger degree leading 
to strengthened independence. These results were also affected by Gul’s research design as 
respondents judged the independence in a case where another department in the audit firm 
provided the non-audit services. 
 
Some of the studies investigated to what degree different types of NAS affected the perception 
of auditor independence. Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) found that perceptions of 
auditor independence in Denmark was negatively affected by the provision of NAS and that 
accounting-related services had the largest influence. They found this surprising as they 
believed that the self-review threat should be bigger when the NAS resembled auditing to a 
high degree. According to Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005), their findings suggested that 
the further away from auditing the NAS provided is, the less of an impact it has on the 
perception of auditor independence. In a U.S study, Colbert et al. (2008) compared the impact 
on independence of two types of NAS and found that the provision of tax services had a negative 
effect while the impact of financial information system design and implementation services was 
limited or non-existent. 
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Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2015) also investigated the impact of NAS in Germany and 
found that the provision of internal control services had the most significant impact on 
perceptions. As they found that the provision of different types of NAS had differing affects, 
they concluded that there should not be a general prohibition of these services. However, they 
expressed support for the limitation of non-audit fees in the EU audit reform as they found that 
the self-interest threat affected perceptions of auditor independence to a high degree. Moreover, 
their study suggested that the limitation set at 70 percent of the audit fees was too high as the 
private investors that responded perceived threats to auditor independence when the economic 
dependency was much lower.   
 
The provision of internal audit services was also found to impair independence in appearance 
by Lowe et al. (1999) and Swanger and Chewing (2001) and by Quick and Warming-
Rasmussen (2009) in a previous German study. However, it was found that as long as personnel 
from outside the audit team provided the internal audit services, both Lowe et al. (1999) and 
Swanger and Chewing (2001) documented increased confidence in the auditors’ ability to 
remain independent. The study by Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) investigated how 
members of an academic investment club perceived various non-audit services and a part from 
internal audit services, it was found that tax services and bookkeeping had a negative effect 
while services related to the accounting information systems had limited effect. 
 
Much like the study by Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2015), the studies of Beattie et al. 
(1999) and Dart (2011) also highlighted economic dependency as a negative influence on the 
perception of auditor independence. In the study of Beattie et al. (1999) it was found that it is 
the dependence of an individual partner and not the firm that reduces independence in 
appearance the most. Dart’s (2011) findings suggested that investors’ confidence in financial 
statements decreases significantly when an auditor is perceived to be economically dependent 
on the company as 53,1 percent of institutional investors and 68,3 percent of private investors 
stated that they would not invest in a company under those circumstances. This indicates that 
the limitation on non-audit fees in the audit reform could actually contribute in increasing the 
stability of the financial market. 
 
Survey studies have also been conducted to compare the perceptions in different countries. 
Dyxhoorn & Sinning (1981) found significant differences between the perceptions of German 
auditors and those of the U.S SEC, presenting evidence that German auditors perceived the 
threats towards auditor independence as less critical and compromising than those of the U.S. 
That view on the ethical issue of independence differs between countries was also found by 
Patel and Psaros (2000) in a comparative analysis including British, Australian, Malaysian and 
Indian students. 
 
Previous survey studies have thus also found contradicting results of the impact of audit tenure 
and NAS. As the survey studies are of particular relevance for this thesis a summary of these 
can be found in the table below. 
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Summary of previous survey studies on perceptions of auditor independence  
Country Research design Findings 
Firth (1980) UK Survey sent to chartered 
accountants, financial analysts 
and loan officers 
Financial analysts and loan officers were 
found to be more sceptical than accountants. 
The experience of financial analysts was not 
found to have an impact. Some responses 
suggested that impaired independence could 
enhance the prospect of an investment 
Dyxhoorn & 
Sinning 
(1981) 
Germany Survey investigating 
perception of independence in 
various auditor-client 
relationships was sent to 
German auditors. Results was 
then compared with SECs 
independence requirements in 
the U.S. 
The position of the SEC was found to be 
much stricter than the perceptions of 
German auditors. In situations where 
German auditors were in consensus they 
only agreed with SEC in one, namely that 
auditor independence was impaired by 
family relations to the client firm. 
Shockley 
(1981) 
US Examined the perceptions of 
certified public accountants, 
financial analysts and bank 
loan officers through an 
experimental case survey. 
Length of auditor-client relationship had an 
insignificant effect on perceptions. 
Competition among audit firms and 
provision of Management advisory services 
(MAS) was thought to be a threat to 
independence. Perceptions differed the most 
in regard to MAS as auditors had a less 
sceptical view. 
Dykxhoorn 
& Sinning 
(1982) 
Germany Survey sent to directors of loan 
departments and directors of 
investment departments of 
large banks 
Auditors are thought to be more 
independent by experienced bankers. 
Auditor independence had no positive effect 
on investment decisions, but perceived 
dependence did. 
Gul (1989) New 
Zealand 
An experimental case survey 
was sent to loan officers at two 
large banks 
Bankers did not think that auditor 
independence was impaired when the audit 
firm provided Management advisory 
services as well. They also viewed 
independence as strengthen when the audit 
firm experienced high competition. 
Schleifer & 
Shockley 
(1990) 
USA Survey sent to accountants, 
bank loan officers and 
financial analysts to determine 
their standpoint on 
independence policies in the 
Cohen Commission Report 
Bank loan officers and financial analysts 
was found to be positive to policies 
restricting the provision of non-audit 
services. 
Bartlett 
(1993) 
USA Survey sent to lending officers 
at banks and certified public 
accountants 
Bankers found the provision of 
Management advisory services as a bigger 
threat than auditors. 
Beattie et al. 
(1999) 
UK Survey sent to finance 
directors of listed companies, 
audit partners and financial 
journalists as a proxy for 
sophisticated users of financial 
statements. 
Economic dependence and NAS was found 
to be the biggest threats. The economic 
dependence of an individual partner was 
thought to be a bigger threat than that of the 
firm. Finance directors found the provision 
of NAS as a bigger threat than auditors. 
Canning & 
Gwilliam 
(1999) 
Ireland Survey sent to corporate 
lenders, investment managers 
and financial analysts 
combined with semi-structured 
interviews 
Threats to independence was perceived to 
be lowest when the audit firm did not 
provide NAS at all, but respondents did not 
support the prohibition. NAS was thought to 
be a threat to independence because of the 
audit firm’s dependency on these fees. 
Lowe et al. 
(1999) 
USA An experimental case survey 
sent to bank loan officers 
The perceptions of auditor independence 
were affected when the auditor provided 
internal audit services as well, leading to a 
revision of loan decisions. This effect was 
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especially strong when the auditor assumed 
management functions. Threats to auditor 
independence was regarded to be smaller 
when other personnel provided the non-
audit services. 
Patel & 
Psaros (2000) 
UK, 
Australia, 
India and 
Malaysia 
Final year accounting 
undergraduates were asked to 
answer a survey by judging 
different scenarios during 
class. 
Found that perceptions on auditor 
independence varied between the different 
countries. The two Anglo-Saxon countries 
showed larger similarities. For example, the 
level of fees was only found to be a big 
threat by UK and Australian students. 
Swanger & 
Chewing 
(2001) 
USA An experimental case survey 
where financial analysts made 
judgements on different 
scenarios. 
Found that the perceptions of auditor 
independence are damaged when the auditor 
also provides internal audit services. When 
these services are performed by separate 
personnel financial analysts did not perceive 
threats to independence. 
Quick & 
Warming-
Rasmussen 
(2005) 
Denmark Survey sent to authorized 
auditors, managing directors, 
bank loan officers, private 
shareholders and business 
journalists 
Management advisory services was found to 
be a big threat by private shareholders and 
business journalists while only 39,3 % of 
managing directors agreed that consulting 
services impaired independence. 
Accounting-related services was found to 
negatively impact the perception of auditor 
independence the least. 
Gates et al. 
(2007) 
USA Business and law students 
were asked to answer an 
experimental case survey. 
Audit partner rotation did not increase the 
students’ confidence in financial statements, 
but firm rotation did. 
Colbert et al. 
(2008) 
USA Loan officers was asked to 
make judgments on a 
hypothetical case through a 
survey. 
The provision of financial information 
system services was not found to affect 
perceptions negatively but the provision of 
tax services was. 
Kaplan & 
Mauldin 
(2008) 
USA MBA students were asked to 
answer an experimental case 
survey during class. 
When the case examined reactions to a five-
year relationship no difference in 
perceptions was found between audit 
partner and audit firm rotation. Results also 
indicated that firm rotation does not affect 
perceptions of independence, even after a 
25-year relationship. 
Quick & 
Warming-
Rasmussen 
(2009) 
Germany A survey was sent to members 
of academic investment clubs 
as representatives of private 
investors. 
Found that the provision of NAS was 
thought to impair independence. Only two 
of 19 different NAS was not believed to be 
a threat: accounting information systems 
and forensic services. Tax services, legal 
advisory, internal audit and bookkeeping 
are examples of services that damaged 
independence in appearance. 
Dart (2011) UK Survey sent to institutional 
investors and private investors 
Economic dependence and NAS was 
thought to be bigger threats to independence 
than long-term relationships between the 
auditor and client firm. 
Daniels & 
Booker 
(2011) 
USA An experimental case survey 
was sent to bank loan officers. 
Auditor independence was perceived to 
increase when the company had an audit 
firm rotation policy. 
Quick & 
Warming-
Rasmussen 
(2015) 
Germany An experiment where private 
investors made judgments on a 
hypothetical company in 
regard to the provision of 
different types of NAS through 
a survey. 
The perception of auditor independence was 
impaired by the provision of NAS, advisory 
services of internal controls was thought to 
be the biggest threat. Results suggested that 
the limit of non-audit fees to 70 % in the 
audit reform is set too high. 
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3.5 A model of previous studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.1: Model of previous studies 
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The model above illustrates the positioning of previous auditor independence research in light 
of long audit tenure and provision of NAS and include both studies of independence in mind 
and in appearance. It is evident that studies on long working relationships have not given 
uniform results, indicating that the debate on the effectiveness of firm rotation is far from over. 
The skepticism towards NAS on the other hand is more clear, where the majority identifies 
provision of NAS as impairing to auditor independence. However, considering the studies 
suggesting the opposite, it is not possible to conclude that NAS impairs auditor independence. 
Further, in some of the studies, the perception of auditor independence differs between the 
groups. Auditors in particular proved more critical towards regulating auditor independence, 
and did not see the mentioned threats as big in comparison to other groups. 
 
An aspect to notice from the model above is the lack of pattern in the mapped research. One 
may expect that comprehensive research studies from the same region should present a 
somewhat consistent result, but the lacking trends support the views of audit tenure and NAS 
as aspects of individual interpretation.  
 
With the findings and detected contradictions as basis, our data will later be analyzed in light 
of the Swedish national context. As the results of Patel and Psaros (2000) imply; it is important 
to carry in mind the characteristics of the national context as they may impact how auditor 
independence is perceived. The study by Dyxhoorn and Sinning (1982) exemplifies this as it 
indicated that the German stock market confidence is so high, investors take auditor 
independence more or less for granted. This, however, is likely a consequence of the national 
context, and may not be applicable to other contexts.  
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
Auditor independence can be defined as the propensity to report detected breaches, and is thus 
connected to the resistance of management pressure. Studies into auditor independence in 
appearance has been unable to find strong support of the notion that NAS and audit tenure has 
a negative impact. Market reactions are inconclusive, and survey studies has had diverse results. 
This suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation and the prohibition of NAS might not be 
effective in enhancing auditor independence. Ratzinger-Sakel and Schönberger (2015) came to 
a similar conclusion when they investigated the prohibition of NAS and found no evidence that 
the legislators of EU member states had failed to protect auditor independence in the past, 
putting the rationale behind the regulation to question. Moreover, much like the literature 
review above they found that there was no conclusive evidence that NAS impairs auditor 
independence, neither in mind nor appearance. 
 
Finally, studies on how NAS and audit tenure affect auditor independence in appearance have 
not been investigated in Sweden. The lacking empirical evidence would therefore suggest that 
the impact mandatory audit firm rotation and restriction of NAS may have on the perceptions 
of the key Swedish stakeholders is uncertain. 
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4. Sweden 
The Swedish environmental context is different from other countries as the economy, culture 
and business practices varies. Therefore, this chapter will begin with a presentation of the 
Swedish economy and culture, followed by an introduction of the Swedish corporate 
governance code. Subsequently the current legislation and principles that the Swedish auditor 
must comply with will be stated, before the new EU audit reform is presented in order to 
determine how the practices will change due to the new legislation.  
 
4.1 The Swedish economy 
According to Bryant et al. (2012, p. 9), the small and open Swedish economy is highly 
dependent on cross-border transactions and the Swedish financial market is inescapably linked 
to the global financial system. Bryant et al. (2012) also claim that financial openness is crucial 
for Sweden’s economic growth. However, being an open economy also has its risks which 
became very evident as the 2008 financial crisis hit Sweden (Bryant et al., 2012, p. 21).  
 
When conducting a study of the perceptions of auditor independence in Denmark Quick and 
Warming-Rasmussen noted the Danish business sector was limited with the consequence of a 
relatively small audit profession (2005). This was claimed to be a huge motivation in the 
conduction of their study as a small marketplace was thought to encourage auditors to behave 
more independently as their reputation could tarnish quickly, but could also be a threat to their 
independence due to the relationship between the client and the auditor being closer. In regard 
to the size of the audit profession, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) stated that the 
population of Danish auditors included about 6000 individuals. This can be compared to the 
Swedish number of 3495 authorized Swedish auditors (Supervisory Board of Public 
Accountants, 2015). If a relatively small audit profession can have an effect on the perceptions 
of auditor independence, as Quick and Warming-Rasmussen assumes, such an effect could thus 
be even more prominent in Sweden. The small audit profession of Sweden can also be compared 
to the large audit profession of the UK encompassing 23 348 auditors (Register of Statutory 
Auditors, 2016), the approximately 13 000 members of the German Institut der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer and the 348 000 members of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (Nobes & Parker, 2012, p. 19). 
 
4.2 The Swedish culture 
The way we comprehend ethical issues is believed to vary between countries due to cultural 
differences (Wines & Napier, 1992; Vitell et al., 1993; MacDonald, 2000; Thorne & Saunders, 
2002). To explain these cultural differences, researchers often use Hofstede’s typology in which 
culture is measured in various dimensions. Even though the country specific scores on most of 
these dimensions are based on over 45-year-old data, Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) recently found 
that while scores have changed during this time their relation to other countries have remained 
the same. The original work of Hofstede can therefore still be of use in explaining cultural 
differences between countries. Based upon Hofstede’s (1988) research figure 4.1 shows how 
the culture in Sweden differs from the culture in the U.S, UK, Germany and Denmark, countries 
that previous studies of the perception of auditor independence has been conducted in.  
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It is directly evident that Swedish culture and therefore possibly the comprehension of ethical 
issues differ from the U.S, UK and Germany. In particular, these countries are regarded more 
masculine, whereas Sweden is strongly feminine. According to Vitell et al. (1993), 
competitiveness is encouraged in masculine countries and this has led to the development of 
business practices to be considered unethical in feminine countries. Based on this assumption, 
individuals of the masculine countries of the U.S, UK and Germany could be more accepting 
of questionable business practices, indicating that they may look more favorably on the 
provision of NAS by an audit firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Cultural dimensions (based on Hofstede, 1988) 
 
Denmark is among the few feminine countries where the perceptions of auditor independence 
have been conducted. In comparison to Sweden, Denmark is quite similar in the dimensions of 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance, however, since a difference in power distance is 
present, this may indicate that the individuals perceive ethical issues differently in the two 
countries based on. According to Vitell et al. (1993), ethical rules could be more important in 
forming opinions of inappropriate behavior in countries with large power distance. This 
suggests that it is more likely that Swedish individuals base their perceptions of auditor 
independence on the established rules governing the auditor’s conduct.  
 
4.3 Swedish Corporate Governance 
The Swedish Corporate Governance Code is regarded as the complement to the national 
legislation, and is a norm-based system of self-regulation. The soft law is based on the principle 
of “comply or explain”, meaning that the companies that choose not to comply should explain 
why. The code promotes good corporate governance through a set of rules on the work of the 
shareholders, nomination committee, the board, directors and chief executive officers. The 
Swedish ownership structure is highlighted in the code as it is perceived as important for the 
Swedish context. In most Anglo-Saxon countries, the ownership structure is quite diverse, but 
in Sweden and other continental European countries, the ownership is often concentrated to a 
small number of large shareholders.  
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The role of the auditor in the Swedish Corporate Governance code is linked to a number of 
aspects in which the first is the nominations committee. The engagement of shareholders in this 
process is an important characteristic in the Swedish corporate governance, and among the tasks 
of the committee is the proposal of the statutory auditor. The code emphasizes that since the 
auditor is elected by the owners of the companies, the auditor is obligated to independently 
report back to the shareholders - free of any influences from the board or the management. The 
code also states that if any board member or manager violate any corporate policies or 
legislation, the auditor is obligated to report it (Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2015). 
In their response to the green paper on audit policy, the Swedish Corporate Governance Board 
also highlighted this unique aspect in Sweden, and stated that the judgement call between the 
advantages and disadvantages of changing audit firm should be left to the nomination 
committee (2010, p. 2). 
 
Finally, besides being based on Swedish norms, the Swedish code is also influenced by the 
European Commission’s recommendations in the field of corporate governance. Among these 
directives is also the regulation of the auditing profession in which this thesis is investigating 
(Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2015). 
 
4.4 Auditing regulations in Sweden 
4.4.1 The Companies Act 
The auditing profession was first regulated in Sweden by the 1895 Act when limited companies 
were recommended to assign auditors to review the financial statements (Öhman and 
Wallerstedt, 2012). The following decades, the acts continued to expand the regulation, 
developing the Swedish auditing profession. The 1932 Kreuger crash indicated however, that 
the auditing profession was still underdeveloped and insufficiently regulated. In the aftermath 
of the crash, it became evident that a high level of secrecy and lack of financial auditing were 
important reasons to why the giant pyramid scheme survived undetected for so long. The 
auditing profession suffered greatly after the crash, and the need for stronger audit practices 
and ethical guidelines set off a range of regulatory changes in Sweden (Jones, 2010). The 1944 
Companies Act was at large a response to the findings in the aftermath of the Kreuger crash, 
and required all listed companies to have at least one authorized auditor. The importance of 
auditor independence was emphasized, and the auditor was now also obligated to conduct a 
more comprehensive audit, verifying that the contents of the balance sheet were consistent with 
the books (Engwall and Morgan, 1999).  
 
4.4.3 The European Union 
As a consequence of Sweden entering the European Union in 1995, Swedish companies are not 
only obligated to follow the national law, but also directives issued by the Union. Since 2006, 
EU-listed companies and auditors have been subject to the Company Law Directive on statutory 
Audit (2006/43/EC). The soon-to-be implemented 2014/56/EU directive is amending the 
directive from 2006, aiming to improve the audit quality and strengthen the independence of 
the auditor. Since the EU regulation takes precedence over national law, directives and 
regulations are placed above the constitution. 
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4.4.2 The Swedish Auditors Act 
Due to the EU membership, the Swedish Auditors Act was passed in order to make the national 
legislation compatible with the established EU regulation (Öhman and Wallerstedt, 2012). This 
regulation mainly surrounds the practical aspects of auditor authorization, as well as audit 
quality controls. The regulation also served as a fundamental basis for the more comprehensive 
Auditors Act of 2001. This act is of great importance to the audit practice and policies, adding 
additional guidance on the aspect of auditor independence. 
 
4.5 Auditor independence in Swedish legislation 
The aspect of auditor independence in Sweden is impacted and regulated by all of the above 
mentioned bodies and legislation. Additionally, a number of non-governmental bodies, national 
and international, serve as important influences on the development of the independent auditor.  
 
The Swedish Auditors Act 19 § and 20 § obligate Swedish auditors to act in accordance with 
the Generally Accepted Auditing Principles (GAAP). The act emphasizes the importance of 
auditor independence, and that the entire audit procedure should be performed in line with 
recommendations to assure a satisfactory level of objectivity. Furthermore, the auditors act 
obligates auditors to test if there are any circumstances that may undermine the confidence in 
their objectivity or independence for each new engagement (21 §). If that is the case, the auditor 
must decline the engagement unless sufficient safeguards are put in place with the result that 
the independence cannot be questioned by an external party. This paragraph contains the so-
called analysis model with the purpose of making sure that auditors are not only independent 
but also being perceived as independent by outside parties (prop. 2000/01:146 pp. 58-65). 
According to 21 §, the act states that in the following circumstances, the Swedish auditor must 
decline the audit engagement: 
 
1. If he or she or anyone else in the network where he or she works: 
a. Has a direct or indirect economic interest in the client’s operations, 
b. Through counselling that is not an audit activity has given advice in a matter that to 
some part is subject to the audit, 
c. Acts or has acted in support of or against the client’s standpoint in a legal or 
economic affair, 
d. Has close personal relationships to the client or any person in its management, 
e. Is subject to threats or other pressure that is intended to intimidate, or 
 
2. If there are any other circumstances of such a nature that it may undermine the 
confidence for the auditor’s objectivity and independence. 
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4.5.1 The IESBA code of Ethics 
In Sweden, all auditors associated with the Swedish Institute of Authorized Public Accountants 
are also obligated to follow the ethical rules of the International Ethics Standards Board for 
Accountants (IESBA) (FAR, 2016). The very first paragraph of this code highlights that 
auditors have the responsibility to act in the public interest and should therefore not only 
accommodate the needs of an individual client or employer (100.1). Because of this the code 
requires all auditors to remain independent from their clients as this is in the best interest of the 
public (290.4). Two varieties of independence are identified in the IESBA code 290.6. 
Independence of mind constitutes the actual mindset of the auditor in which it is possible to act 
with integrity, objectivity and professional skepticism whereas independence in appearance 
refers to how outside parties perceive the auditor’s ability to act accordingly. 
 
To remain objective is also one of the fundamental principles of the IESBA code and is defined 
as “to not allow bias, conflict of interest or undue influence of others to override professional 
or business judgments” (100.5 b). Further, the code identifies various threats to objectivity and 
the other fundamental principles (100.12): 
 
1. Self-interest threat – the threat that a financial or other interest will inappropriately 
influence the professional accountant’s judgment or behaviour. 
2. Self-review threat – the threat that a professional accountant will not appropriately 
evaluate the results of a previous judgment made or service performed by the 
professional accountant, or by another individual within the professional accountant’s 
firm or employing organization, on which the accountant will rely when forming a 
judgment as part of providing a current service. 
3. Advocacy threat – the threat that a professional accountant will promote a client’s or 
employer’s position to the point that the professional accountant’s objectivity is 
compromised. 
4. Familiarity threat ─ the threat that due to a long or close relationship with a client or 
employer, a professional accountant will be too sympathetic to their interests or too 
accepting of their work. 
5. Intimidation threat – the threat that a professional accountant will be deterred from 
acting objectively because of actual or perceived pressures, including attempts to 
exercise undue influence over the professional accountant. 
 
As the attentive reader will probably have noticed the threats from the IESBA code in a)-e) 
strongly resembles the circumstances under which a Swedish auditor would have to decline an 
audit engagement in accordance with the Swedish auditors act 21 § a)-e).  The IESBA code 
also identifies various scenarios where these threats would appear. 
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Other threats identified in the IESBA code 
As objectivity is a component of auditor independence, all threats to objectivity presented above 
are also threats to independence. However, the IESBA code also contains further details of 
circumstances which may threaten auditor independence. One example is the provision of non-
audit services which according to the IESBA code 290.156 can create threats to independence 
in the form of self-review, self-interest and advocacy. The code points out a number of non-
audit services that may have a negative impact on the auditor’s independence, including 
bookkeeping (290.168), valuation services (290.176), taxation services (290.182), internal audit 
services (290.196), IT system services (290.201), legal services (290.209), recruiting services 
(290.214) and corporate financing services (290.216). 
 
Furthermore, the IESBA code 290.220 states that self-interest or intimidation threats may be 
created if a large fraction of the audit firm’s total revenues comes from fees of an individual 
client. This is also applicable to the case when fees from an audit client represents a large share 
of the revenues an audit partner brings into the firm (290.221). 
 
4.6 The EU audit reform 
The EU audit reform originated from the former Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services, Michel Barnier, who was the driving force behind the green paper and the subsequent 
debate about the role of the auditor. Barnier stated that the role of the auditor in the financial 
crisis had been largely ignored (European Commission, 2010b), and the green paper can 
therefore be seen as an attempt to place the auditors in the limelight. One of the main objectives 
of the green paper was to discuss how changes to the audit function could help achieve market 
stability. The concern for a lack of auditor independence emanated from the fact that banks 
involved in the financial crisis had received clean audit opinions (European Commission, 
2010a). In relation to this, the green paper stressed that auditors play an important societal role 
and suggested that they had failed to fulfill this responsibility in the events leading up to the 
crisis. Moreover, emphasis was put on auditor independence that “should thus be the bedrock 
of the audit environment” (European Commission, 2010a, p. 3). Two measures that were 
suggested to strengthen auditor independence was mandatory audit firm rotation and the 
prohibition of some Non-audit services. 
 
Many organizations responded to the green paper but despite some heavy critic from audit 
firms, investors and public authorities (European Commission, 2011a) the Commission 
continued their quest to reform the audit function by adopting a proposal for a EU directive and 
regulation in the matter (European Commission, 2011b). The Commissioner Michel Barnier 
stated “Investor confidence in audit has been shaken by the crisis and I believe changes in this 
sector are necessary: we need to restore confidence in the financial statements of companies. 
Today's proposals address the current weaknesses in the EU audit market, by eliminating 
conflicts of interest, ensuring independence…” (European Commission, 2011b). One of the 
suggestions in this proposal was the mandatory audit firm rotation after a period of 6 years, 
with the possibility to expand to 9 years in the presence of joint audit. 
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This proposal was thereafter reviewed by JURI, the European Parliament committee for legal 
affairs, who, for example, expressed a wish to expand the period an audit engagement could 
continue without rotation to 25 years (amendment 168). In December 2013, the European 
Parliament and the Member states made an agreement on how the Commission’s proposal 
should be altered (European Commission, 2013). This agreement was welcomed by Barnier 
who claimed that the new reform would lead to financial stability, even though it was less 
ambitious than the Commissions initial proposal. The new regulations in regard to auditors’ 
independence will be discussed below. 
 
4.6.1 Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation (EU) no 537/2014 
The audit reform in Directive 2014/56/EU and regulation (EU) no 537/2014 is applicable to 
statutory audits of Public Interest Entities (PIEs). According to the amendment of Directive 
2006/43/EC, a PIE is an entity in a Member state listed on a regulated market in the EU, a credit 
institution or an insurance undertaking (art. 13). Member states have the option to define 
additional entities as a PIE if these for some reason are of significant public relevance. To date 
there is no suggestion from the Swedish legislator to expand the definition of PIE in any way 
(Prop. 2015/16:162, p. 12). 
 
For the audit of entities identified as PIEs, regulation (EU) no 537/2014 specify that an 
engagement may not surpass ten years (art. 17). However, the regulation allows the member 
states to legislate that firm rotation must take place sooner, or later, extending the timeframe to 
20 years if tendering is conducted, and an additional four years in the presence of a joint audit 
(art. 17(4)). The preparatory proposition suggests that the Swedish legislator will permit the 
maximum timeframe for listed companies (prop. 2015/16:162, p. 33). The introduction of 
mandatory audit firm rotation will not remove the obligation to rotate the audit partner after 
seven years as article 42(2) of Directive 2006/43/EC has not been amended. That partner 
rotation should be maintained was stressed in the green paper as this would prevent companies 
from circumventing the regulation by following the partner to a new audit firm (European 
Commission, 2010, p. 11). 
 
Another regulation aimed at improving independence is the prohibition of certain non-audit 
services (NAS). According to article 5(1) of regulation (EU) no 537/2014 the audit firm and 
the network it belongs to may not provide the audit client, its parent company or company under 
its control with blacklisted services the audited year and the year before that. In regard to some 
of these blacklisted services, member states are allowed to permit them under the circumstance 
that it has no direct or unessential effect on the audited financial statements and that 
documentation on the estimated effect is given to the audit committee in an additional report 
(art. 5(3)). The prohibited services and which can be permitted by member states can be seen 
in the table below. In Sweden the legislator has proposed that all of the derogations be entered 
into the Swedish auditors act (Prop. 2015/16:162, p. 16). 
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Blacklisted non-audit services 
Service Permission to allow 
Tax services Preparation of tax forms Yes 
Payroll tax No 
Customs duties No 
Identification of public subsidies 
and tax incentives unless support 
from the statutory auditor or the 
audit firm in respect of such 
services is required by law 
Yes 
Support regarding tax inspections 
by tax authorities unless support 
from the statutory auditor or the 
audit firm in respect of such 
inspections is required by law 
Yes 
Direct-, indirect and deferred tax 
calculations 
Yes 
Tax advice Yes 
Services involving management or decision-making in the entity 
Bookkeeping and preparation of accounting records and financial statements 
Payroll services 
Design and implementation of internal control or risk management procedures that are related to the preparation 
or control of financial statements as well as design and implementation of financial information technology 
systems 
Valuation services Yes 
Legal services The provision of general counsel 
Negotiation on the behalf of the audited entity 
Acting in an advocacy role in the resolution of litigation 
Internal audit services 
Services linked to the financing, capital structure and allocation, and investment strategy of the audited entity 
Promoting, dealing in, or underwriting shares in the audited entity 
Human resources services Searching for, seeking out and undertaking reference checks for 
management in a position to influence the preparation of accounting 
records or financial statements 
Structuring the organisation design 
Cost control 
Figure 4.2: Table of the prohibited Non-Audit Services (Regulation (EU) no 537/2014) 
 
In a further attempt to strengthen the auditors’ independence, regulation (EU) no 537/2014 also 
mandates that total fees for permitted non-audit services may not exceed 70 percent of the 
averaged audit fees for three years (art. 4(2)). Member states have been given the permission to 
allow exemption from this rule if requested by the auditor on exceptional grounds. The Swedish 
legislator has proposed that such an exemption rule will be imposed in a new 22 a § of the 
Swedish auditors act (Prop. 2015/16:162, p. 17). 
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4.6.2 Changes in Sweden due to the EU audit reform 
When comparing the current law regulating the independence of auditors in Sweden with the 
EU audit reform the biggest change is arguably the implementation of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. In regard to the non-audit services some of the these would already have been out of 
the question for Swedish auditors as the IESBA code lists many of them as independence 
impairing. Non-audit services highlighted as potential threats to independence in the IESBA 
code include taxation services, bookkeeping services, valuation services, internal audit services, 
IT system services, legal services, recruiting services and corporate financing services. The only 
two services blacklisted by the EU not mentioned by the IESBA code are thus services 
involving management or decision-making in the entity and payroll services. Although these 
services are not explicitly mentioned in the IESBA code they may both create self-review 
threats which should be taken into consideration by the Swedish auditor as a part of the 
analytical model.  
 
The biggest difference for the Swedish auditor in regard to NAS would thus be that they 
previously were able to judge their independence in each individual case when following the 
principles-based IESBA code and that this level of autonomy has been removed and replaced 
by stricter rules that directly prohibits some services.  
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
The small audit profession in Sweden may influence the perceptions of auditor independence 
in the country which may therefore be very different from those in the UK, Germany and U.S 
were the audit profession is much larger. This may thus be regarded as a unique national aspect 
that separates Sweden from many of the countries where previous studies have been conducted. 
The perception of auditor independence and the ethical grounds on which it is based on, may 
also differ in Sweden in comparison to other countries due to cultural differences, something 
this thesis will attempt to investigate. Moreover, the Swedish context also differs from other 
countries in regard to corporate governance were a concentrated ownership structure is an 
important Swedish characteristic in contrast to many Anglo-Saxon countries. As evident from 
the previous chapter many of the previous studies on the perceptions of auditor independence 
are conducted in these countries and due to the contextual differences, the results of those 
studies may not be transferable to Sweden. Another Swedish characteristic is the presence of 
the nomination committees in which the dominant shareholders have the power to influence the 
choice of auditors.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter has presented the current regulation affecting auditor independence 
in Sweden today, as well as the new audit reform imposed through the EU. While the 
implementation of mandatory audit firm rotation is entirely in Sweden, it was found that many 
of the prohibited services are already out-ruled through the recommendations of the IESBA 
code. This means that an important change from the reform is the transition from being allowed 
to make own judgement calls in regard to non-audit services, to stricter regulation with less 
room for discussion.  
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• Albin Rännar the Chief of market surveilance of the Swedish Shareholder's 
Association
• Nils Lilliedahl the secretary general of the Swedish Society of Financial Analysts
• A fund manager
Financial market actors
• CFOs of three Swedish listed companies
• Claes Norberg the accounting expert of the Confideration of Swedish Enterprise 
PIEs
• Auditors from three Swedish audit firms
• Helene  Agélii the Chief legal counsel of Swedish Institute of Authorised Public 
Accountants and partaking in the Swedish assessment of the reform
The Audit profession
5. Results and analysis of interviews 
The results of the conducted interviews will be presented and analyzed in this segment.  
Additionally, when the viewpoints of the auditors in this analysis are presented, we have chosen 
to exclude stating the workplace. It was noted during the interviews that the opinions of the 
auditors were not significantly influenced by the culture of their firm. This was especially 
evident as the three representatives from PwC argued both in line with and in contrast to each 
other. Representatives of the following stakeholder groups identified above are included 
through conducted interviews:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Interviewees 
 
5.1 The viewpoint on the objectives of the EU audit reform  
5.1.1 The audit profession 
Helene Agelii, chief legal counsel at FAR and partaking in the Swedish assessment of the 
reform, stated that there were originally three outspoken goals from the regulatory changes; 
“the first objective was to improve audit quality, the second was to strengthen auditor 
independence, and the third objective was to dissolve the market concentration surrounding the 
Big Four”. Agelii questioned, however, the assumptions on which the reform is based on, 
pointing out that “there are no empirical evidence that firm rotation is necessary”. In support of 
the reform, she concluded that it is unlikely that the EU would initiate a comprehensive 
legislation if the public had not expressed an insecurity towards the independence of the auditor.  
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The auditors pointed out the 2008 financial crisis as an important explanation to the reform, 
however, on the contrary it was also emphasized that the audit profession could not be blamed 
for the crisis. One of the auditors stated that “when the market crashes, it is not a direct 
consequence of the auditing industry”. It was pointed out that we live in a society where there 
is a high level of skepticism and low level of tolerance, something that was perceived a big 
challenge for the Swedish auditing profession. Despite this view, the auditors regarded the focus 
on auditor independence as positive and as an attempt to establish a uniform regulation within 
the European Union to increase the capital market confidence. From an investors viewpoint, 
one of the auditors argued that the reform would not have been initiated if it was only based on 
the wishes of the investors; “politicians, the media and the fear of independence related issues 
have been the driving forces”.  
 
5.1.2 Financial market actors 
In line with the audit profession, the financial market actors pointed out the financial crisis as a 
trigging factor to the reform. Nils Liliedahl, Secretary General in The Swedish Society of 
Financial Analysts, argued that most legislative changes originate from crises and that “the 
objective is eventually to increasingly monitor the companies and the relationship between the 
client and the auditor”. The fund manager argued that the regulation had not been much up to 
debate in the fund industry, and pointed out that fund managers respond more to specific events 
rather than new regulation. Albin Rännar, director of market surveillance of the Swedish 
Shareholder´s Association, stated that the new reform may be unnecessary in the Swedish 
markets, but that it is the price to pay for accessing the European markets. He concluded that 
“the audit industry is eventually built on public trust and trust is expensive to regulate”. 
 
5.1.3 Public interest entities 
Among the public entity representatives, the regulation was welcomed, and although it was 
understandable that all listed companies should play by the same rules, the reform was at the 
same time viewed somewhat unnecessary and less applicable to small-cap. Claes Norberg 
agreed in this statement, stating that the public interest in these firms is typically smaller, and 
that the financial impact of the reform will be more significant here in comparison to larger 
firms. On an overall level, Norberg perceived the reform as “a way to prove the European 
Union´s ability to take action after the crisis”. 
 
5.2 The viewpoint on auditor independence 
5.2.1 The audit profession 
Integrity and the ability to be neutral and free from any external influences which may impact 
the audit were pointed out as important aspects to enhance auditor independence. Additionally, 
the auditors highlighted auditor independence as a twofold; independence in mind and 
independence in appearance. Among the two, independence in mind was considered more 
difficult to evaluate in owner-managed firms, since the auditor tends to have a closer 
relationship with the management of non-listed companies. 
 
50 
 
This was partly explained by the fact that these firms often chose their auditor based on personal 
chemistry rather than on a firm level. Further, although the auditors stated that it is equally 
important to document their independence in all engagements the documentation process for 
listed companies could be perceived as more critical due to the public eye and larger scale of 
interests. At the same time, due to a more comprehensive platform of regulation and thereby 
clarified guidelines, this procedure was considered less complicated in engagements for listed 
companies. It was concluded that “the documentation process of auditor independence may feel 
more important in listed company engagements, but then more difficult to evaluate in owner-
managed firms due to the a less comprehensive regulation”. Moreover, one of the auditors 
pointed out that the positive effects of a good client-auditor relationship was to some degree 
misunderstood; “the public would probably prefer the auditor keep its distance from the 
management, but good solutions do emerge from good relationships”. This difficult relationship 
balance is in line with the findings of Bamber and Iyer (2007) who stated that the auditors´ 
knowledge and understanding of the client serve as an important fundament to promote audit 
quality. 
 
Agelii argued that the focus on ethics and moral issues have increased significantly in Sweden 
over the last decade; “companies are no longer demanded to only follow legislation, but also to 
act within the moral norms of society”. Parallel to the development in ethical business behavior, 
the auditors stated that the discussions on auditor independence have been intensified over the 
last decades, and that “the focus on auditor independence have been strengthened through new 
and expanded regulation, something that was particularly reinforced after the Enron scandal”. 
It was also mentioned that in addition to the establishment of a clear and transparent set of rules 
and standards, the audit firm leadership strategies have developed, resulting in “significantly 
improved internal processes”. 
 
5.2.2 Financial market actors 
Albin Rännar stated that since society places a great deal of trust into the work of the auditor, 
it is essential to secure their independence. He argued that “society expects the auditor to be 
independent”, concluding that the auditor independence might be very far down on the checklist 
when investors evaluate an investment. This was exemplified with the expression that “it is not 
until it is burning that you call the fire brigade”. Rännar emphasized that one must separate 
between dominant owners and small investors. He argued that auditor independence may be 
more important for the minority investors as the dominant owners have a far better insight into 
the company. Nils Lilliedahl from the Swedish Society of Financial Analysts reasoned 
similarly, arguing that “financial analysts do not care about who the auditor is as long as an 
auditor has actually audited the financial statements”. He also stated that a sell-side analyst 
would not care at all about auditor independence. Similar findings were found in Germany 
where Dyxhoorn and Sinning (1982) noticed that auditor non-independence had a negative 
impact on investment decisions but that auditor independence was not influential. The authors 
explained that in certain countries, investors might expect auditors to be independent, and will 
therefore not include this aspect in the evaluation process unless it is considered to be poor. 
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Their findings on non-independence is also at large in line with our as the fund managers 
pointed out scandals and media attention as more influential. Our support to the German study 
may be a consequence of cultural similarities. Research suggest that similarities within cultural 
heritages is an important factor explaining why some countries establish stronger trading 
relationships (Guiso et al, 2009). The fact that Germany is the most important trading partner 
of Sweden (Business Sweden, n.d.) may therefore indicate that the longstanding relationship is 
built on some degree of cultural compliance which could explain why the views are similar. 
Additionally, Sweden and Germany share many of the same economic principles from the 
European model where less faith is placed in the “invisible hand”, creating a rather active state 
(Veggeland, 2007). The level of government intervention may therefore be another explanation 
to why the financial market actors seem to trust the markets to the extent that they exclude 
auditor independence when evaluating investments. High levels of market trust in Sweden may 
also be partly a result of the increased ethical focus stated by Helene Agelii. 
 
5.2.3 Public interest entities 
One of the CFOs stated that “the main task of the auditor is to question, critically investigate 
the financial statements and furthermore assure that the legislation is being followed”. This was 
largely supported by the other two representatives. It was furthermore emphasized that no 
owner, large or small, should be favored. There was a uniform perception of the auditor as more 
than a stamp of quality; “The auditors are an important sounding board; they are close to us”. 
At the same time, the importance of a professional and transparent relationship was emphasized. 
Further, all the company representatives stated that in order to establish an efficient audit, the 
chemistry between the two parties is important. Thereby, one may conclude that these aspects 
of the relationship between the auditor and the management could be difficult to balance. Antle 
(1984) in the US and Watts and Zimmerman (1979) in the US/UK found the relationship 
between the auditor and management to be a critical balance point and significant threat towards 
auditor independence. Moreover, considering that IESBA has identified and included this threat 
in the code of ethics (i.e. familiarity threat), as well as the Swedish Auditors Act to some extent 
points out the same aspects, one may conclude that this finding was expected - confirming a 
common view on the relationship balance between the auditor and the client.  
 
Further, Claes Norberg pointed out the difficulties surrounding regulating auditor 
independence, stating that “the problem is that one can only regulate independence in 
appearance. Independence in mind is impossible to regulate meaning that the risk of 
dependency will present in all business relationships”. The CFOs stressed that auditor 
independence was believed to be crucial for their investors’ confidence in the financial 
statements. All of the CFOs were thus in agreement that an independent auditor was not only a 
regulatory demand, but also of value to their owners.  
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However, in line with the statements of the financial market actors, Claes Norberg noted that 
the investors are rarely portrayed when the media cover stories on auditor independence, 
something that could confirm the statement that owners assume auditor independence is intact 
as long as there is no crisis. Norberg stressed that the issue of auditor independence should be 
important to the owners, but that this could be questioned due to the Swedish ownership 
structure. 
 
5.3 The viewpoint on audit firm rotation 
5.3.1 The audit profession 
On the aspect of audit firm rotation, the audit profession was positive towards rotation, stating 
that it is probably never good to be part of the same engagement for very long. However, it was 
pointed out that the relationship between the auditor and the client is not statical, and the 
possible challenges from placing time as the critical factor was highlighted. It was argued that 
since both the team, partner and client management rotate “you will never have the same 
counterpart for more than seven years. This aspect is never addressed in the media”. Further, 
the US study by Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) found that audit firm rotation had limited effect 
on the perceptions of auditor independence, and that it did not add more value than partner 
rotation. Helene Agelii argued similarly, stating “it is good that auditor independence is up to 
discussion, but firm rotation is a rather blunt tool”. 
 
Moreover, it was argued that the implementation of firm rotation would lead to an increase of 
audit fees. This was explained by the fact that the shorter time periods and growing number of 
audit tenders must be compensated for. One of the auditors argued that if the audit fee is too 
low, the engagement cannot carry itself “due to the longer startup, firm rotation is an investment 
for both parties. It is therefore important that the rotation period is not too short, and that there 
is some level of assurance that the engagement is good business for us. If not, we are no longer 
independent”. It was also argued that audit tenure would not only fail to enhance auditor 
independence, but also reduce the audit quality. This finding support the study by Geiger and 
Raghunanden (2002) where it was concluded that it is within the first years of an engagement 
that the majority of audit reporting failures occur. Moreover, it was argued that the importance 
of auditor independence is to a large degree determined by the culture of the firm and the 
internal processes. The auditors did thereby not feel a need for increased regulation, and 
concluded that audit firm rotation would eventually not enhance auditor independence.  
 
5.3.2 Financial market actors 
In order to support why audit firm rotation is necessary, Albin Rännar referred to a study on the 
independence of board members conducted in relation to the development of the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Code. By drawing parallels to this study, Rännar argued that “the auditor 
cannot be independent after ten years. The parties have become very close to one another”. He 
acknowledged that whether an auditor is independent or not is not solely a consequence of time, 
but also impacted by the individual´s level of integrity.  He however concluded that this was 
not a sufficient argument to rule against the implementation of audit firm rotation. 
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The fund manager saw both positive and negative sides to firm rotation. A fresh set of eyes was 
regarded an important upside, however, on the contrary he agreed with the auditors, stating that 
the new team would not possess the same company knowledge as the former team. On this 
aspect, Nils Liliedahl agreed with the fund manager, highlighting more or less the same benefits 
and challenges with firm rotation. Finally, Rännar stated that although market efficiency will 
decline and audit fees will increase, audit firm rotation is a necessary action to stimulate the 
trust to both the markets and the auditing profession. Overall, the interview subjects were quite 
positive towards mandatory audit firm rotation. The findings of this study are thus the opposite 
of two previous UK studies. Firth (1980) found an insignificant effect on the perceptions of 
auditor independence when asking about a ten-year relationship, while Dart (2011) found 
support for the notion that partner rotation was enough to protect auditor independence. 
Explanations to why our findings differ may be another consequence of variations among 
economic models. While the UK follows the Anglo-Saxon model with limited market 
regulation, Sweden follows the Scandinavian model where state intervention is more desirable. 
The positive attitude towards firm rotation among the Swedish financial market actors could 
therefore be partly explained by the role of the government in the Swedish society. 
 
5.3.3 Public interest entities 
The companies understood the importance of rejecting too close relationships, and saw rotation 
as something positive. Those who had experienced rotation, described that “it was refreshing 
to rotate the auditors, they had a different focus, but there was of course much more 
administrative work for us since the new team did not possess the same knowledge of the 
company as the previous team”. The long and demanding start-up period was emphasized by 
all the interviewees. Moreover, the companies saw team and partner rotation as enough to 
enhance auditor independence, and did not find it necessary to also rotate the firm. This was 
explained by the impression that the larger audit firms possess largely the same competences 
and knowledge. Based on this assumption, it was stated that “It is the partner rotation that 
matters […] To also rotate the firm would not add value to any parties”. In line with the auditors, 
increased costs were also highlighted. One of the CFOs argued that since the relationship 
between the client and the auditor is a two-way, the management could be more involved in the 
process of avoiding tight relationships. 
 
Claes Norberg viewed audit firm rotation as a fairly primitive tool to protect the owners, and 
perceived the new regulation as an attempt to tackle the agency problem. He questioned the 
positive effects from firm rotation, stating that “it becomes difficult when regulation is set to 
decide when it´s time to rotate […] Then if the firm is in a crisis or not doing well, forced audit 
firm rotation will become a big burden”. Norberg did understand the possible correlation 
between long working relationships and auditor independence, but emphasized that longer 
working relationships do add important continuity and efficiency to the audit.  
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Finally, Norberg concluded that he believed the effects from firm rotation could be similar to 
those in the Netherlands where the regulation and increased number of audit tenders led to 
increased audit quality. It should be noted that this outcome was questioned by the auditors who 
argued that it was more likely that the effect would be opposite since the level of trust and 
knowledge in every engagement are fundamental factors on which the audit quality is built on.  
 
5.4 The viewpoint on non-audit services 
5.4.1 The audit profession 
The auditors did not fully identify themselves with the allegation that NAS compromise the 
independence of the auditor. The group did understand that the economic dependency could be 
perceived a threat, but did not experience the service combination as compromising. This was 
partly explained by the clear guidelines that is provided by the comprehensive regulatory 
platform on which the audit of Swedish listed companies is based on. It was stated that in 
Sweden “this is not thought to be a problem”. These assertions support the findings of Defond 
et al. (2002), Craswell (1999) and Hay et al (2006), but at the same time partly reject the study 
by Kinney et al. (2004). This US research found the provision of NAS as compromising towards 
auditor independence, however at the same time it also found a positive correlation between the 
provision of NAS and audit quality. Previous research on NAS from the viewpoint of auditors 
is thereby mainly negative towards the assumption that it compromises auditor independence.  
However, the impact social desirability bias may have on our interview data should not be 
ignored. Therefore, based solely on the views of auditors, one cannot conclude that auditor 
independence is not affected by the provision of NAS in Sweden. 
 
From the beginning it was anticipated that mandatory audit firm rotation would benefit the 
smaller audit firms, however most auditors in this research argued that these firms do not 
possess broad enough competences to conduct a large and complex audit. It was stated that 
“when companies must change auditor, certain criteria will be listed […] In the end, the listed 
firms know who they want to work with”. According to the auditor at Grant Thornton, the 
company do not see an opportunity within the area of auditing, but do believe that there will be 
an increased demand of non-audit services. He stated “since the companies may behave more 
cautiously, the outcome could be that consulting services will be purchased from the firms 
outside the big four”.  
 
5.4.2 Financial market actors 
Nils Liliedahl stated that “Auditor independence could definitely be compromised by 
combining the audit with non-audit services. There is no doubt about that”. Both the fund 
manager and Albin Rännar agreed on this. Rännar argued that “when the audit firm also provide 
the client with consulting services, a conflict of interest occurs. Since these consulting services 
are very profitable, it is possible that the auditor will withhold critique towards the company in 
fear of losing the client”. He concluded that auditors under no circumstances should be subject 
to any conflicts of interests, and that the Swedish Shareholder’s Association was open to 
prohibit the provision of all non-audit services to the audit client.  
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Economic dependency was also pointed out as a threat in the Irish study by Canning and 
Gwilliam (1999), however, the respondents in this research did not support the prohibition of 
these services. The findings of Swanger and Chewning (2001) USA are both confirmed and 
rejected since their study found NAS compromising, but only if it was conducted by the audit 
team. Finally, our findings are at large in conflict with the findings of Gul (1989) in New 
Zealand where the results suggested that auditor independence was strengthened if NAS was 
also provided. However, considering the significant growth in NAS provision during the 90s as 
well as the following auditing scandals (Gwilliam et al., 2014), the study by Gul may be 
outdated. It could therefore be concluded that regardless of economic models, there is a 
common view of NAS as compromising among financial market actors.  
 
5.4.3 Public interest entities 
The companies expressed a mixed feel towards the restriction, and stated that they had not 
experienced that the use of NAS had been in conflict with the audit. They explained that the 
services they had purchased had been conducted by other teams from the audit firm, something 
that had eased the process since the teams could communicate directly instead of through the 
company. One of the CFOs stated that “The benefits of prohibit NAS will be very limited, 
possibly non-existent”. Further, it was argued that the use of NAS in smaller firms was not 
comparable to that of larger listings, something one of the CFOs criticized in the new reform 
“It is the same set of rules for a small firm like us and a larger listing like Ericsson. It could be 
argued that the differences between a global entity and a local player should have been taken 
more into account”. Overall, there was a shared understanding that the auditor independence 
could be negatively impacted when large number of services are being purchased. Eventually 
none of the representatives believed that it would be problematic to hire a third party to provide 
these services if necessary. Finally, two of the representatives explained that they had 
experienced a growing cautiousness among the auditors “I have noticed that our auditors 
thoroughly evaluate whether they can provide certain services or not. And if their integrity 
could be compromised, it is good to separate the services”.  
 
Claes Norberg highlighted the downsides to restricting NAS, pointing out the benefits from 
using an audit firm with knowledge of the concerns and possible obstacles in the company. It 
was stated that since prohibition will force companies to assign a third party, more 
administrative work will be placed on both the auditors and the companies - a price the client 
will have to carry. Norberg argued that “The reform will not be a problem for the larger listings, 
they can take it [the increased costs], but if you look at the smaller listings, how will the 
economic impact affect them? This is where it will hit”.  
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The UK study by Beattie et al. (1999) suggested that financial directors found NAS and 
economic dependency as big threats towards auditor independence. Our interview subjects 
acknowledged this threat, but since they had not experienced it as compromising, it could be 
argued that our findings do not entirely confirm the UK study. It is evident that one must 
separate between large and small listings. Further, our results are more in line with Quick and 
Warming-Rasmussen´s (2005) findings where the majority of Danish directors did not perceive 
the provision of consulting services as compromising. It could be argued that our support to this 
study and furthermore the rejection of the UK findings are again results of cultural dimensions 
and the role of governments in respective countries. As emphasized earlier in this analysis, the 
UK and other Anglo-Saxon countries have limited market regulation while the European and 
Scandinavian models have a more active state.  Additionally, Denmark and Sweden are close - 
not only in terms of geographic location, but also in regard to historic events, trade, culture and 
values (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014). This is also reflected in the model by Hofstede 
(1988), and similarities like these may explain our support to the Danish study as well as our 
rejection of the UK findings. 
 
5.5 The viewpoint on potential consequences of the EU audit reform 
5.5.1 The audit profession 
On the potential effects the reform may have on the Swedish markets, Helene Agelii argued 
that among the three objectives of this reform “EU have completely failed to open up the 
market. I believe this regulation will have the opposite effect since larger listings need an audit 
firm of a certain size”. Moreover, the cost and administrative work that follow from this 
regulation was a common concern within this group, and Agelii pointed out that “even if the 
auditor independence strengthens and the audit quality improves, it will not happen for free”.  
 
Among the auditors, the directive´s effect on auditor independence is expected to be very 
limited. There was a shared belief that this aspect is sufficiently regulated in the current 
legislation, and it was argued that stricter regulation is not positively correlated with auditor 
independence. Instead, it was stated that company atmosphere and focus on transparency and 
ethics were more relevant factors to determine the level of independence. A recurring concern 
was the impact rotation may have on revenue, and it was pointed out that “when a large 
engagement rotates, it may not be replaced by a new client […] The rotation will impact the 
profitability of the audit firms, and the rather stable level of income we have now will fluctuate 
more”. This will require the audit firms to be much more flexible, a flexibility the auditors 
perceived as a great challenge. A number of interviewees believed that one consequence could 
be that key members of the old team would rotate together with large companies, and thereby 
add some level of continuity to the engagement. The relocation of human resources was also 
seen as a necessary action to secure the work of the auditors - especially in smaller cities where 
the loss of large engagements could leave the audit firm with periods of limited workload. One 
of the auditors stated that “while the former audit firm may struggle to find work to those who 
used to work with the rotating client. On the other hand, the new audit firm may not have enough 
resources available to conduct the audit and the result may be that former team members will 
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rotate with the client”. Further, it was argued that the audit tenders will enhance the auditor-
client relationship and force the audit firms to spend more time on building relationships with 
potential clients long before rotation. Focus on client relationships was not considered a 
challenge towards auditor independence. 
 
One of the auditors raised concerns in regard to the impact the regulation may have on services 
where the audit has been an important entry point. She questioned “how will these services 
manage to recruit new clients that are not using our audit services”. Further, she stated that there 
is a possibility that the outcome could be internal conflicts “there is a risk that the profitable 
departments don´t want to carry the less profitable departments”. How this challenge will be 
met seemed quite uncertain, but since the audit engagements will need to carry itself without 
help from other services, the audit fees will arguably increase. 
 
Further, Agelii pointed out the lack of evidence suggesting a need for stricter regulation to 
secure auditor independence, and compared the reform with the process of hunting a ghost. She 
stated that “the EU is attempting to solve a problem no one knows to exist”. At the same time, 
Agelii concluded that the focus on auditor independence will increase the awareness around it, 
and although the regulation may not strengthen auditor independence, it could still result in 
increased trust in the financial markets.  
 
The possible outcomes of the numerous member state options and the variations in the national 
implementation processes were discussed and questioned. Several interviewees had anticipated 
that an important objective of the audit reform was to establish a uniform legislation across the 
EU member countries, but due to the regulatory flexibilities not all the interviewees believed 
this objective would be met. Agelii argued that “the national legislation will differ significantly 
among the countries and this is a failure by the EU. The process for auditors to comply with 
these variations will become a challenge […] There will be more focus on compliance than on 
the actual objectives of the reform; to enhance audit quality and auditor independence.” Agelii 
concluded that the first year after implementation will serve as a testing period.  
 
Overall, there was no view of Sweden as a unique country in the implementation process, and 
it was argued that the challenges faced and tackled here in Sweden, were the same struggles of 
other member states. 
 
5.5.2 Financial market actors 
Within the group of financial market actors, there was mixed feel towards the effectiveness of 
the reform in Sweden. Nils Liliedahl stated that “I do not see how the market nor the level of 
independence would be affected by the regulation”. He argued that no financial analysts have 
any interest in these matters, and that the development of auditor independence in Sweden 
receives limited attention in the industry.  
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Albin Rännar disagreed with Liliedahl, stating that he believed both independence in mind and 
in appearance would be strengthened by the new reform. Rännar explained that “policies create 
norms which express how things are expected to be”. Further, Rännar hoped that the regulation 
would eventually increase the investor trust in the financial markets, and that this would lead to 
rising stock prices. The fund manager was also positive towards the focus on independence, but 
in line with Nils Liliedahl, he argued that the reform had received little attention in the fund 
industry. He stated that the fund managers did care about auditor independence, but that this 
aspect was not actively discussed when evaluating new investment options. Moreover, Rännar 
agreed with Agelii, stating that “legislation and regulation are no magic bullet, you have to do 
some test-driving”. 
 
5.5.3 Public interest entities 
The companies did not see that the regulation would impact much in the auditing industry. 
Mandatory audit firm rotation was perceived largely unnecessary, especially since the big firms 
are so uniform in competence and knowledge. One of the CFOs stated that “the listed firms will 
stay with their auditors as long as they can, and rotate as seldom as possible. Because it is a 
demanding process”. The current legislation was perceived adequate and the CFOs did not see 
an evident need of more regulation to enhance auditor independence. They concluded however, 
that when non-audit services will be needed in the future, the companies will make sure to stay 
well inside the lines of the new legislation and to a larger extent separate the audit from other 
services. On the matter of dissolving the market concentration, the company representatives 
stated that due to a need of complete competences they would not be interested in working with 
the smaller audit firms, but would instead continue to rotate among the larger firms. 
 
Claes Norberg highlighted the balance between social and economic impact, stating that it may 
not be fair that the smaller listings which also tend to have a limited impact on society, will be 
more financially exposed in comparison to the larger firms. Norberg concluded that “I don´t 
believe that auditor independence will be enhanced. Partly since there will still be long rotation 
periods, but also because I see this reform more as a power to act after the financial crisis in 
Europe”. 
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6. Results and analysis of survey 
The results of the survey sent to auditors, top management, financial analysts, fund managers 
and private investors will be presented and analyzed in the following. For the convenience of 
the reader the response rate is presented once again in the table below. As evident from the 
number of responses, the results may only be seen as an indication of the perception of these 
groups.  
 
Stakeholder Sample Respondents Response rate 
Auditors 665 40 6 percent 
Top management 333 80 24 percent 
Financial analysts 111 16 14,4 percent 
Fund managers 65 12 18,5 percent 
Private investors - 13 - 
Figure 6.1: Sample and response rate for all groups 
 
6.1 Audit tenure 
Feelings towards mandatory audit firm rotation were overall positive as the majority of nearly 
all groups stated that they thought it would be a good tool to secure auditor independence. 
However, it was evident the auditors had a more negative view on mandatory audit firm rotation 
than was found in the other groups.  
 
Do you believe that a forced change of audit firm after ten years (audit firm rotation) is a good tool to secure 
auditor independence? 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
Yes 53,8  50 41,7 61,3 53,8 
No 30,8 25 33,3 32,5 43,6 
Don’t know 15,4 25 25 6,3 2,6 
Figure 6.2: Percentage response in regard to mandatory audit firm rotation 
 
Since the general opinion about mandatory audit firm rotation was rather positive one would 
expect the perceptions of auditor independence to be significantly affected by long audit tenure. 
However, when asked about a work relationship of ten years, perceptions varied. While more 
than half of all the private investors and financial analysts agreed fully or partially to the claim 
that an auditor cannot be independent when the audit firm has had the same client for ten years, 
fund managers were more inconclusive as many of them stated to be neutral. The observation 
that financial analysts seem to perceive a ten-year audit tenure as a threat to auditor 
independence is the opposite result from what Firth (1980) found in the UK, which may indicate 
a difference in context or a change of time. That financial market actors could have become 
more critical since 1980 is plausible as this was before the Enron scandal erupted and put the 
auditor’s independence in the limelight.  The perceptions of top management showed a large 
variation with 40 percent agreeing, 23.8 being neutral and 36.3 disagreeing. While the median 
suggests that top management is a somewhat neutral group in respect to ten-year audit tenure, 
the relatively high standard deviation indicates that this is an issue they do not agree upon to a 
large degree.  
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The group of auditors was the only group where the majority disagreed, indicating that they do 
not see auditor independence to be substantially threatened by a long audit tenure. As the 
median for auditors in this question is 5, one can firmly place them as a group that does not 
perceive auditor independence as impaired by a ten-year tenure, yet one should also note the 
standard deviation which suggests that there is also some degree of disagreement within the 
group.  A gap between the perceptions of financial statement users and auditors were also found 
by previous studies of Bartlett (1993), Beattie et al. (1999), Quick & Warming-Rasmussen 
(2005) and Shockley (1981).  
 
When an audit firm has been hired by the same company for ten years the auditor cannot be independent 
anymore 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
1. Fully 
agree 
7,7 - 8,3 5 - 
2. Partially 
agree 
53,8 50 16,7 35 20 
3. Neutral 23,1 18,8 41,7 23,8 5 
4. Partially 
not agree 
7,7 12,5 25 11,3 17,5 
5. Fully not 
agree 
7,7 12,5 8,3 25 57,5 
Don’t know - 6,3 - -  
Median 2 2 3 3 5 
Standard 
deviation 
1,1 1,1 1,1 1,3 1,2 
Figure 6.3: Percentage response in regard to a ten-year audit tenure 
 
The perceptions of the efficiency of audit partner rotation in protecting auditor independence 
were quite ambivalent, as can be seen in figure 6.4 below. While the majority of both auditors 
and top management seems to believe that the current regulation in this area is sufficient, 30.8 
percent of private investors and 37.6 of financial analysts disagreed. Based on the answers in 
this survey, fund managers do not seem to believe that further measures are needed as only 8.3 
percent stated that their opinion was not that audit partner rotation was a sufficient measure. 
Moreover, the median of their answers are also an indication of this and combined with a 
standard deviation of only 1.0, this suggests that the group is more or less in agreement in regard 
to this issue. 
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In my opinion it is a sufficient measure to change the audit partner each seven years to protect auditor 
independence. 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
1. Fully 
agree 
15,4 - 8,3 20 27,5 
2. Partially 
agree 
30,8 25 33,3 33,8 40 
3. Neutral 15,4 25 41,7 20 15 
4. Partially 
not agree 
23,1 6,3 - 15 15 
5. Fully not 
agree 
7,7 31,3 8,3 10 2,5 
Don’t know 7,7 12,5 8,3 1,3 - 
Median 2 3 2,5 2 2 
Standard 
deviation 
1,3 1,3 1,0 1,3 1,1 
Figure 6.4: Percentage response in regard to partner rotation 
 
Although the majority of auditors have claimed that audit partner rotation is enough their 
responses to the question about audit firm rotation indicates the opposite as 47.5 percent agreed 
that the audit firm should also change periodically to protect auditor independence. The 
majority of private investors, financial analysts and top management also stated that audit firms 
should change periodically, suggesting that these may have a favorable view on the mandatory 
audit firm rotation imposed by the EU. The median of all groups are all below or precisely 3 
indicating that the average perception of these groups are positive, or at least neutral towards 
the measure to rotate audit firms. However, as one can see from figure 6.5 below, the standard 
deviation is especially high for private investors indicating a big variation in the views of this 
group. Fund managers did not seem to oppose audit firm rotation as only 16.6 percent disagreed 
to this claim.  
 
The audit firm should also be changed periodically to protect auditor independence. 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
1. Fully 
agree 
33,3 31,3 8,3 21,3 7,5 
2. Partially 
agree 
16,7 31,3 33,3 33,8 40 
3. Neutral 16,7 18,8 41,7 15 17,5 
4. Partially 
not agree 
16,7 - 8,3 13,8 12,5 
5. Fully not 
agree 
16,7 12,5 8,3 16,3 22,5 
Don’t know - 6,3 - - - 
Median 2 2 3 2 3 
Standard 
deviation 
1,6 1,3 1,1 1,4 1,3 
Figure 6.5: Percentage response in regard to firm rotation 
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6.1.1 Commentaries to audit tenure 
A fund manager noted that every case of audit is unique and added that it could also be 
beneficiary to have an experienced auditor that knows the company well as this increases their 
ability to provide the company with good advice. 
 
Further, one of the top managers highlighted the time it takes to establish a good understanding 
of the company, indicating that this individual could see disadvantages from being forced to 
rotate audit firm: 
 
“If the auditor is independent or not is about personal characteristics, ethics, moral and 
professional conduct of the auditor. One shall also remember that listed companies today are 
immensely complex as it demands time to get to know the market, processes, systems and key 
people. If the auditor has the ability to independently stand for their decisions is a question of 
the backbone of that person, nothing else.” 
 
6.1.2 Correlation 
In figure 6.6 below Spearman’s rank correlation (ρ) has been calculated to show how the 
different variables are related to each other. Answers to the question about mandatory audit 
firm rotation have been found to have a correlation with feelings towards a ten-year audit tenure 
in all groups. This correlation can be considered strong in three groups, namely private 
investors, top management and auditors. In regard to private investors a correlation between 
these two variables of 0.635 ρ combined with the results presented above suggests that their 
positive view on mandatory audit firm rotation is connected to a scepticism towards the 
auditor’s ability to remain independent. The strong correlation of 0.62 ρ for auditors also 
suggests that a large part of respondents answering that mandatory audit firm rotation would be 
a good tool also regarded auditor independence to be impaired after ten years and vice versa. 
This indicates that personal feelings towards the independence impairing properties of a long 
audit tenure effects the auditor’s viewpoint of this measure.  
 
The results of this correlation analysis could also be taken as an indication that the auditor’s 
that have responded to this survey have been affected by the phenomenon of ‘social desirability’ 
to a low degree. This can be seen by the weak correlation between the question regarding partner 
rotation and the two questions about a ten-year tenure and firm rotation. In all other questions 
of a likert scale asked in this study it can be assumed that the socially desirable answer would 
be to disagree. The insertion of one question where the socially desirable answer would be the 
opposite can thus show if the respondents have answered disagree to all questions mechanically 
(Bryman & Bell, 2013, p. 254). If auditors would have answered the likert scale questions in 
such a way, the correlation between all of these questions would thus be strong and positive. 
The weak correlation can therefore be seen as an indication that the answers have not been 
affected by this phenomenon to a large degree. 
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Figure 6.6: Spearman’s rank correlation (ρ) for all groups for the questions regarding audit tenure. *. 
Correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed) 
 
6.2 Non-audit services 
In regard to non-audit services, the majority of all groups shared a positive opinion about a 
prohibition of certain non-audit services. Private investors seemed to endorse this measure the 
most as 61.5 percent stated that prohibition would be a good tool to secure auditor independence 
while only 15.4 percent were of the opposite opinion.  
 
Do you believe that a prohibition for an audit firm to sell certain other services to a company they audit is a 
good tool to secure auditor independence? 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
Yes 61,5 50 58,3 52,5 52,5 
No 15,4 37,5 33,3 41,3 45 
Don’t know 23,1 12,5 8,3 6,3 2,5 
Figure 6.7: Percentage response in regard to the prohibition of NAS 
 
 
 
ρ Private investors Mandatory audit firm rotation 10-year tenure Partner rotation Firm rotation
Mandatory audit firm rotation 1
10-year tenure 0,635* 1
Partner rotation 0,023 -0,005 1
Firm rotation 0,283 0,231 0,459 1
ρ Financial analyst Mandatory audit firm rotation 10-year tenure Partner rotation Firm rotation
Mandatory audit firm rotation 1
10-year tenure 0,319 1
Partner rotation 0,098 0,563* 1
Firm rotation -0,014 0,488 0,018 1
ρ Fund manager Mandatory audit firm rotation 10-year tenure Partner rotation Firm rotation
Mandatory audit firm rotation 1
10-year tenure 0,411 1
Partner rotation 0,346 -0,096 1
Firm rotation 0,217 0,876* -0,243 1
ρ Top management Mandatory audit firm rotation 10-year tenure Partner rotation Firm rotation
Mandatory audit firm rotation 1
10-year tenure 0,609* 1
Partner rotation -0,046 -0,107 1
Firm rotation 0,604* 0,671* -0,253 1
ρ Auditor Mandatory audit firm rotation 10-year tenure Partner rotation Firm rotation
Mandatory audit firm rotation 1
10-year tenure 0,620* 1
Partner rotation -0,146 -0,140 1
Firm rotation 0,513* 0,535* -0,168 1
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The majority of private investors and financial analysts stated that they agreed that an auditor 
is not independent when the audit firm also sells other services to the company. The effect that 
the provision of NAS had on the perceptions of auditor independence was thus greater for the 
financial market actors than that of top management and auditors. These results are hence along 
the line of the majority of previous studies (e.g Bartlett, 1993; Beattie et al., 1999; Canning & 
Gwilliam, 1999; Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Colbert et al., 2008; Quick & Warming-
Rasmussen, 2015; Shockley, 1981; Lowe et al., 1999; Swanger & Chewing, 2001; Quick & 
Warming-Rasmussen, 2009) and the opposite of Gul’s (1989) New Zealand study. As the New 
Zealand study may be outdated it would thus appear as the provision of NAS is not perceived 
differently in diverse countries.  
 
As only 17.5 percent of auditors stated that the auditor is not independent when the audit firm 
sells other services, a larger percentage of top management, 35.4 percent, shared this opinion. 
This question thus illustrates how the perceptions of financial market actors and auditors are on 
different ends of the spectrum, with top management somewhere in between.  This result is in 
line with the Danish study by Quick & Warming-Rasmussen (2005) who also found the same 
difference in perceptions. That top management perceives situations slightly more 
independence impairing than auditors was also found by Beattie et al. (1999). This difference 
in perceptions between different groups does thus not appear to be influenced by contextual 
differences as our findings resemble those of both Anglo-Saxon and fellow Scandinavian 
country studies. From the median answers of this study it is also very clear that the groups that 
perceives NAS as the smallest threat are the top managers and auditors, however, the standard 
deviation still indicates some disagreement within these groups. 
 
The auditor is not independence anymore if the audit firm also sells other services to the company. 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
1. Fully 
agree 
30,8 18,8 16,7 2,5 2,5 
2. Partially 
agree 
38,5 43,8 33,3 32,9 15 
3. Neutral - 12,5 33,3 12,7 2,5 
4. Partially 
not agree 
7,7 6,3 16,7 34,2 45 
5. Fully not 
agree 
15,4 18,8 - 17,7 35 
Don’t know 7,7 - - - - 
Median 2 2 2,5 4 4 
Standard 
deviation 
1,5 1,4 1,0 1,2 1,1 
Figure 6.8: Percentage response in regard to the impairment of NAS 
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In order to determine if there are any difference in the perception of the self-interest and the 
self-review threat in the provision of NAS the answers to the statements that these makes the 
auditor dependent are combined in figure 6.9 below. The table indicates that auditors are more 
inclined to perceive self-review as a threat than the self-interest threat. As the median shows, 
the auditors are also the group that has the strongest opposition to the claim that NAS creates 
economic dependency. Although there is some disagreement within the auditor group, the 
standard deviation is lower in regard to the self-interest threat, indicating that they share a more 
common perception on this issue. The majority of private investors perceived both of these as 
serious threats to auditor independence, although a larger percentage of these agreed to the 
statement in regard to the self-review threat. The self-review threat was also most prominent 
for the fund managers. On the contrary, a larger percentage of both the financial analysts and 
the top management agreed to self-interest being a big threat to the auditor’s independence. The 
standard deviation of the financial market actors also indicate that the group responded 
consistent in regard to the self-review threat. 
 
That an audit firm sell other services to a company the audit - makes them economically dependent on that 
company (- means that they must review their own work), which means that the auditor cannot be 
independent anymore.  
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
1. Fully 
agree 
53,8 (53,8) 31,3 (26,7) 33,3 (8,3) 3,8 (6,3) 7,5 (12,5) 
2. Partially 
agree 
30,8 (38,5) 25 (26,7) 16,7 (33,3) 40 (27,8) 7,5 (27,5) 
3. Neutral 7,7 (7,7) 6,3 (20) 16,7 (33,3) 15 (22,8) 10 (2,5) 
4. Partially 
not agree 
- (-) 18,8 (-) 16,7 (8,3) 25 (27,8) 30 (25) 
5. Fully not 
agree 
7,7 (-) 18,8 (20) 16,7 (-) 16,3 (15,2) 45 (32,5) 
Don’t know - (-) - (6,7) - (16,7) - (-) - (-) 
Median 1 (1) 2 (2) 2,5 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 
Standard 
deviation 
1,2 (0,7) 1,6 (1,5) 1,6 (0,8) 1,2 (1,2) 1,3 (1,5) 
Figure 6.9: Percentage response in regard to the self-interest and self-review threats 
 
The majority of private investors found the provision of all non-audit services to impair auditor 
independence. However, the standard deviation of this group was between 1.4 and 1.7 for all 
of these services indicating some degree of disagreement. This was especially prominent in 
regard to tax services which showed the highest standard deviation indicating that the private 
investors of this study are not homogenous in their perceptions of this service, although the 
majority of them viewed them as independence impairing. 
 
In regard to the other two financial market actors majority support was not found for the notion 
that payroll services make the auditor dependent and in fact 43.8 percent of financial analysts 
actually disagreed to this statement. The standard deviation also suggests that this group was in 
disagreement regarding this issue. Although a majority of fund managers did not find that 
human resource services impair independence, 33.3 percent of fund managers were neutral, 
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indicating that the services was considered irrelevant to them. However, the median of this 
group suggests a slight tendency to perceive the service as independence impairing at 2, while 
the standard deviation of 1.2 further shows some disagreement in the group. As evident from 
the table below, majority support in the group of fund managers was also absent in regard to 
tax consultation. While 41.6 percent of these agreed that such services impaired auditor 
independence, 33.3 percent had the opposite opinion. The standard deviation shows a larger 
disagreement in regard to tax consultation at 1.5. 
 
Although a majority of private investors and financial analysts, as well as 41.6 percent of fund 
managers and 36.3 percent of top management perceived independence as impaired by tax 
consultation, only 7.5 percent of auditors agreed to this. The auditors responding to this survey 
also appeared to be in agreement over this issue with a standard deviation of 0.9. This shows a 
rather significant difference in perceptions of auditor independence. Once again, top 
management can also be seen to place themselves in the middle of financial market actors and 
auditors. 
 
However, the latter was not evident in all cases as top managers found the services of payroll, 
legal services, services involving promotion of, dealing in or underwriting shares, human 
resource services and services linked to the financing, capital structure and allocation, and 
investment strategy as less compromising to auditor independence than the auditors themselves. 
Therefore, one may not conclude that top management are always in the middle in regard to 
perceptions of auditor independence.  
 
Combined percentage of respondents agreeing to the claim that the different non-audit services leads to the 
auditor not being independent anymore 
 Private 
investors 
Financial 
analysts 
Fund 
managers 
Top 
management 
Auditors 
Tax consultation 
 
61,6 62,6 41,6 36,3 7,5 
Bookkeeping services 
 
69,3 50,1 66,7 66,3 67,5 
Payroll services 
 
53,9 25 41,7 36,3 40 
Services related to internal controls 
 
61,6 62,6 83,3 53,8 46,1 
Legal services 
 
69,3 56,3 58,3 35,4 40 
Services involving promotion of, dealing in 
or underwriting shares in the company 
 
53,9 66,7 50 37,5 41 
Human resource services such as the 
participation in the recruitment of leading 
positions in the company 
 
61,1 50,1 41,7 46,9 73,7 
Services that on some way means taking 
part in the decision-making of the company 
 
77 68,8 66,6 83,8 95 
Valuation services 
 
69,3 60 58,3 51,3 44,7 
Services linked to the financing, capital 
structure and allocation, and investment 
strategy of the company 
61,6 56,3 66,6 40 67,5 
Figure 6.10: Percentage response in agreement in regard to the different non-audit services 
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For some of the services, all groups were relatively in agreement that these impaired auditor 
independence, namely regarding bookkeeping services and services involving participation in 
decision-making. The latter was also the service that auditors reacted strongest to as 95 percent 
agreed, giving a standard deviation of 0.6. Moreover, auditors were also the group where the 
highest percentage found human resources as a threat, indicating that they may have other 
insights into how this service may compromise independence. 
 
6.2.1 Commentaries to the provision of NAS 
One private investor noted that responsible tendering of services should be required by both the 
auditors and the companies. A company manager also indicated that the companies also have a 
responsibility, noting that the company must keep track of the services they buy and have a 
decision-process around this.  
 
Comments from both private investors and top management stated that the degree to which the 
independence could be tarnished depends on the size of the audit firm. Larger audit firms were 
assumed to be less at risk as they are able to provide the services through employees of other 
departments. 
 
Many auditors responded that the impairment of the auditor’s independence is reliant on the 
circumstances of each individual case. Below, the commentary of one auditor has been 
translated to English to shed light on how auditors reflect on this matter: 
 
“The boundary for what an auditor is permitted or prohibited to do is very clear. Of course we 
as auditors cannot help to recruit leading executives, or partake in decisions. It goes without 
saying that we cannot do that. For each assignment performed in addition to the audit a thorough 
review is conducted to secure that the service in question does not affect our independence. If 
it does, we of course say no to the assignment. Even if some services are marked ‘OK’ for us 
to perform, we sometimes say no because the outside world might perceive it as compromising 
towards independence. If that is the case, we are forced to decline no matter if we really are 
allowed to perform the service.” 
 
Another auditor directed critique towards the EUs cap on NAS fees and wrote: 
 
“To place an exact percentage cap on advisory services like in the EU audit reform, suggests 
that the legislator believes that you always charge exactly the time spent and that it is not 
questionable what is what. That is an illusion in my opinion, the EU is trying to obtain an 
accuracy that does not exist…” 
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6.2.2 Correlation 
Spearman’s rank correlation has also been calculated between the questions regarding non-audit 
services and tables presenting this can be found on the following pages. The tables show that 
there is a correlation between the standpoint regarding the measure to prohibit certain NAS and 
feelings towards these services’ independence impairing properties. This correlation is strong 
for the groups of private investors and top management. A correlation between these of 0.613 
ρ for private investors combined with the results presented above indicates that their skepticism 
towards the auditor’s ability to remain independent when NAS is provided is connected to their 
faith in the measure to prohibit certain services. Moreover, the correlation for private investors 
between NAS impairment and both economic dependence and self-review is strong. This 
indicates that respondents answering that NAS impairs independence is also likely to have 
answered that both economic dependence and the self-review threat is prominent. However, the 
correlation is higher in regard to the self-review threat at 0.806 ρ in comparison to 0.694 ρ and 
this may be taken as an indication that private investors connect the self-review threat to 
independence impairment to a larger degree than the economic dependence.  
 
The other group where answers to the questions about the measure to prohibit NAS and the 
independence impairing properties of these services showed a high correlation was the top 
management. As this group showed a larger variation in responses the strong correlation of 0.62 
ρ suggests that it is likely that respondents answering that the prohibition of NAS would be a 
good tool also found these services to impair independence and vice versa. For this group the 
correlation between NAS impairment and economic dependence and self-review can also be 
considered strong at 0.714 ρ and 0.652 ρ. This may also indicate that it is likely that those that 
agreed that NAS impairs independence also agreed that this was due to both economic 
dependence and the self-review threat and that those that disagreed to the statement that NAS 
impairs independence also disagreed to the other two statements. However, these results also 
suggest that top management are more inclined to connect economic dependence to 
independence impairment than the self-review threat.  
 
In regard to the different non-audit services only one is strongly correlated to NAS impairment 
for the top management group, namely tax consultation at 0.628 ρ. This could be taken as an 
indication that the 35.4 percent of top management that responded that they agreed that the 
provision of NAS impairs the auditor’s independence also agreed in regard to tax consultation. 
If that is the case it suggests that top management connect tax consultation to auditor 
independence to a larger degree than other non-audit services. On the contrary the weak 
correlation between the other non-audit services and NAS impairment may also suggests that 
some of the managers disagreeing to the statement that NAS impairs independence still found 
that some of these services was compromising. This suggests that while some managers may 
not think of non-audit services as impairing as a whole this position may change when these 
services are divided into smaller components.  
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Previously it has been found that the majority of financial analysts found NAS to impair auditor 
independence. The correlations calculated above also suggests that these connect this 
impairment with economic dependence at 0.874 ρ. All non-audit services have been found to 
be correlated with NAS impairment for this group which suggests that it is likely that financial 
analysts agreeing to the statement that NAS impairs independence also find the different 
services to be compromising. The connection between NAS impairment also appears to be the 
strongest in regard to internal controls, legal services, human resources, decision-making, 
valuation and financing. This may indicate that it is these services that has had the strongest 
influence on the financial analyst’s perception of the independence impairing properties of non-
audit services. 
 
For fund managers the percentage of answers indicates that they perceive the self-review threat 
as slightly more prominent than the self-interest threat. The correlation calculations have, 
however, found a weak correlation between NAS impairment and the self-review threat of only 
0.11 ρ which indicates that many of the respondents agreeing to the statement that NAS is 
impaired due to the self-review threat had not previously answered that they found NAS to 
impair auditor independence. This may suggest that the initial reaction of the fund managers 
when faced with the statement that NAS impairs auditor independence was influenced by the 
economic dependence to a larger degree, as this correlation was strong at 0.79 ρ. If this is the 
case it indicates that the self-review threat might not be something that the fund manager 
considers unless being reminded of its possible existence.  
 
As the majority of auditor’s disagreed to the statement that auditor independence is impaired 
by the provision of NAS the weak and sometimes even negative correlation between NAS 
impairment and the different services is somewhat surprising. For example, the correlation of 
0.002 ρ for internal controls suggests that some auditor’s that had answered disagree in regard 
to NAS as a whole changed their mind when the type of service was specified. It can thus not 
be concluded that auditor’s do not perceive NAS as a threat to auditor independence based upon 
the results of this survey, despite such a large majority response to that question. A possible 
explanation to this surprising result is that the auditor’s might regard NAS in general as those 
services that would be allowed, while many of the services asked about in the survey would 
already today be out of the question in accordance to the analysis model of 21 § auditors act. 
This possibility would be plausible if we assumed that the auditors answered the first question 
based upon experience, as they would have encountered far more situations in which the audit 
was performed simultaneously with allowed services.  
 
6.3 Financial market reaction 
In order for the EU audit reform to meet its objective and enhance the stability of the financial 
market, the measures taken must arguably be able to affect how financial market actors see 
auditor independence. As we have already detected, the responding financial market actors do 
perceive audit tenure and NAS as threats to auditor independence. However, in order for the 
market to stabilize, these actors must also be affected by auditor independence in their 
investment or reporting decisions and these groups have therefore been asked if the auditors 
independence is a part of their evaluation.    
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Is the auditors’ independence a part of your evaluation of an eventual investment (Private investor and fund 
manager), -a listed company (Financial analyst)? 
 Private investor Financial analyst Fund manager 
Yes 38,5 31,3 75 
No 61,5 68,8 25 
6.13: Percentage response in regard to investment- or analyst- evaluation 
 
In regard to both the private investors and the financial analysts, who may also influence the 
decision-making of the investors, the majority claimed not to include the auditor’s 
independence in their evaluation. This indicates that these groups are unlikely to trigger a 
substantial market reaction when the audit reform is implemented. However, if the results of 
this survey give an accurate indication of the fund managers position, a market reaction could 
follow as 75 percent stated to include the auditor’s independence in their decision-making. 
While this could be taken as an indication that fund managers evaluate the auditor’s 
independence, we recognize that a degree of response bias could be present as only 12 fund 
managers responded to our survey. There is thus a possibility that these fund managers wanted 
to participate as they had a larger interest in the independence of auditors than their colleagues. 
If we would assume that such a response bias was present and all the fund managers that had 
an interest in the topic as they included the auditor’s independence in their evaluation 
responded, this would mean that 13,8 percent of the fund managers surveyed evaluates the 
auditor’s independence. Therefore, it can be said that for the sample of fund managers included 
in this thesis between 13,8 and 75 percent looks at the auditor’s independence. 
 
Would you refrain from investing in a company if you got the impression that the auditor was not independent 
anymore (Private investor and fund manager)? – Would you include it in your analyst reports (Financial 
analyst)? 
 Private investor Financial analyst Fund manager 
Yes 53,8 68,8 83,3 
No 46,2 31,3 16,7 
Figure 6.14: Percentage response in regard to reactions 
 
The success of the EU audit reform in creating market stability is also dependent on the degree 
to which the financial market actors would actually act on their perceptions of the auditor’s 
independence. All of the financial market actors responded with majority support that they 
would both refrain from an investment or include it in a report if they got the impression that 
the auditor was not independent, indicating that there is potential for a market reaction. These 
results also suggest that the more sophisticated investor, i.e. the fund manager, would react to 
a larger degree as more of these responded positively. However, as these financial market actors 
might not evaluate the auditor’s independence at all, a market reaction could still be absent as 
they would not have the opportunity to obtain a bad perception of the auditor’s independence 
to begin with.  
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6.3.1 Commentaries to the evaluation and impact of auditor independence 
One private investor chose to elaborate the response to the question if the auditor’s 
independence impacts the evaluation of an investment: “It is difficult to say if it affects my 
eventual investment. It probably has a larger impact in smaller ‘speculative companies’ where 
the valuation of the company can be significantly affected if the auditor conveys incorrect 
information”. This statement thus indicates that for this individual private investor the issue of 
auditor independence would not impact the investment decision in larger listed companies.  
 
Further, it was stated by a fund manager that: “It is about making an overall assessment. The 
auditor’s eventual dependency should be seen as a risk among other so called ESG-risks, in 
particularly the governance part”.  
 
6.3.2 Correlation 
To see how the financial market actors have answered to the two questions presented above in 
connection to audit tenure and NAS the correlation between these has been calculated and are 
presented in the table below. While both private investors and financial analysts have responded 
in majority that they agree to the statement that an auditor is not independent after a ten-year 
tenure, they show a diverse correlation between this and the question as to if they would react. 
As previously discussed the majority of both of these groups also stated that they would refrain 
from an investment if they found the auditor’s independence to be impaired. The relatively 
strong correlation of 0.572 ρ for financial analysts suggests that audit tenure would be 
something that they would react upon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Spearman’s rank correlation (ρ) for the financial market actors in regard to audit tenure, 
NAS, evaluation and reactions. *. Correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed) 
 
ρ Private investors 10-year tenure NAS impairment Evaluation Reaction
10-year tenure 1
NAS impairment 0,120 1
Evaluation 0,404 0,150 1
Reaction -0,185 0,221 0,571 1
ρ Financial analyst 10-year tenure NAS impairment Evaluation Reaction
10-year tenure 1
NAS impairment 0,561* 1
Evaluation 0,466 0,413 1
Reaction 0,572* 0,189 0,647* 1
ρ Fund managers 10-year tenure NAS impairment Evaluation Reaction
10-year tenure 1
NAS impairment 0,198 1
Evaluation 0,533 0,297 1
Reaction 0,460 0,329 0,633* 1
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However, the weak and even negative correlation of -0.185 ρ for private investors indicate that 
many of those that were not critical to the auditor’s ability to remain independent after ten years 
subsequently responded that they would refrain from an investment. Furthermore, it also 
suggests the opposite, that some of those that were critical to a ten-year tenure answered that 
they would not react upon it. These results can thus be taken as an indication that a long audit 
tenure is unlikely to influence the actual investment decision of private investors.  
 
As the correlation for financial analysts between NAS impairment and reaction is relatively 
weak at 0.189 ρ this also suggests that it is more likely that they would react to a long audit 
tenure rather than the provision of NAS. 
 
6.4 Other commentaries to auditor independence 
One of the participating financial analysts shared the belief that the only measure that could 
secure auditor independence is to impose substantially higher liabilities on the audit partner. 
Another financial analyst noted that it is uncertain how external parties could determine if the 
auditor is independent or not, concluding that the only thing to really go on are the notes listed 
companies include in financial reports about services bought from their audit firm. 
 
An auditor shared the opinion that auditors can never be entirely independent as long as they 
are being remunerated by the client and in order to be entirely independent, remuneration would 
have to be given by the state in some way. 
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7. Discussion 
The discussion will be two-parted where the first part will analyze the results of both the 
interviews and the survey in light of previous research while the second part will discuss the 
effects of the EU audit reform in Sweden. Considering the contradictions and lacking patterns 
in previous research, the findings in this thesis will both support and question earlier studies. It 
is believed that the trends that will be mapped in the following could be consequences of the 
characteristics of the Swedish society, and may therefore not be transferable to other contexts. 
In regard to the research design, one may state that while the interviews allowed us to collect 
detailed information, adding more depth to our study, the survey allowed us to cover a far larger 
group of respondents. It was therefore important that the combined analysis of this data was 
balanced between depth and coverage. 
 
7.1 Contribution to the theoretical platform on auditor independence   
7.1.1 Audit tenure and audit firm rotation 
The interviews suggested that, although the auditors agreed that long working relationships may 
not be good for any parties, they did not believe that auditor independence would be impacted 
by mandatory audit firm rotation. Interestingly enough, this was not entirely supported by the 
survey where the respondents were divided into two groups. While approximately half of the 
auditors disagreed with the interviewed auditors and proved positive towards mandatory audit 
firm rotation, the remaining auditors (43,6%) proved largely negative. Based on these 
observations, it is difficult to conclude whether Swedish auditors perceive lengthy relationships 
as compromising or not. On the other hand, the interviews allowed the interviewees to elaborate 
their thoughts within the Swedish context. The auditors acknowledged the familiarity threat as 
potentially compromising, however largely rejected it as a problem within the Swedish auditing 
profession. Considering this aspect, one may argue that our findings are more in line with 
previous research concluding that auditor independence is not compromised by audit tenure 
(Knechel and Vanstralen, 2007; Geiger and Raghunanden, 2002; and Carcello and Nagy, 2004).  
 
Moreover, another interesting finding within the group of auditors was that although the 
majority was positive towards mandatory firm rotation after ten years, there was still a vast 
disagreement with the statement that the auditor is not independent after ten years. On an overall 
level one may conclude that the negative tone is dominating this group, but there are not 
sufficient grounds to map a shared perception of the effectiveness of mandatory audit firm 
rotation on independence. 
 
The interview data presented the financial market actors as positive towards firm rotation, 
however, the downsides were also acknowledged and discussed. Furthermore, the survey 
conveyed results in line with this, stating that the respondents believed in the efficiency of 
mandatory audit firm rotation. This study has thus found indications that financial market actors 
are positive towards this measure which has also been found in the studies of Gates et al. (2007) 
and Daniel and Booker (2011). Moreover, although the response on mandatory audit firm 
rotation was quite consistent among the respondents, the results indicated that fund managers 
are more neutral towards audit tenure and the effects it may have on auditor independence in 
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comparison to the other respondents. An interesting finding when comparing the results of the 
interviews and the survey data was that while Nils Liliedahl expressed that most financial 
analysts do not reflect about the independence of the auditor, the survey presented the financial 
analysts as the most critical group, promoting stricter regulation. This result thereby both 
confirms and rejects the findings of Dart (2011) who found long term relationships less 
compromising towards independence. 
 
The top management´s view on audit firm rotation was divided. The interview data suggested 
that the group was positive towards partner and team rotation, but did not see any value in 
rotating the firm. The survey however, presented the top management as the most positive group 
towards firm rotation. Further, it could be argued that there was a lacking consistency within 
the group as the majority of the respondents in the survey also stated that partner rotation was 
a sufficient measure to enhance independence, indicating that firm rotation is unnecessary. 
Thereby the interview data receives support from the survey on this matter. Previous research 
on top management´s perception of auditor independence within the area of audit tenure is 
rather limited, suggesting that the interest in the views of top management is low. One may 
question why this interest seems relatively absent, especially since it is the relationship towards 
management that audit rotation seeks to regulate. As one of the CFOs pointed out; more 
responsibility in regard to auditor independence could be placed on management, and further 
research could preferably focus on how this group may contribute. Considering the significant 
response rate in the survey, the positive attitude towards audit firm rotation is inevitable. On 
the other hand, however, the contradicting view on partner rotation makes it difficult to 
conclude that top management is positive towards firm rotation. 
 
7.1.2 Non-audit services 
While the views on the effectiveness of audit firm rotation varied, not only between the key 
stakeholder groups, but also within them, the data on NAS presented more uniform results. 
 
The interview data suggested that auditors understand why external groups would see NAS, 
and economic dependency in particular, as compromising, but did not find stricter regulation 
on auditor independence as necessary since the guidelines today are so clear. The survey did 
support this result, stating that the auditors did find prohibition of certain services as a good 
tool to enhance auditor independence. However, the respondents did not identify themselves 
with the statement that the auditor automatically becomes dependent when other services are 
sold to the client firm. This critical view reflects the findings of both Beattie et al. (1999) and 
Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) where the auditors responded that provision of NAS 
did not have a compromising effect on independence. Moreover, as the auditors indicated that 
the provision of NAS was not a threat to auditor independence in mind, the results of this study 
may therefore be regarded as support to the conclusions of Defond et al. (2002), Craswell 
(1999) and Hay et al (2006). Considering the phenomenon of social desirability, these answers 
had to be analyzed with cautiousness and a critical eye. We can thus not ignore the findings of 
Kinney et al. (2004) which suggested that NAS may impair auditor independence. Therefore, 
although both the survey and interview data present NAS as non-compromising, it is somewhat 
problematic to draw conclusions.  
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Although the findings of these previous studies into auditor independence in mind are unlikely 
to have been compromised by social desirability they may have been affected by the choice of 
measurement as a proxy for auditor independence. These studies have used measurements 
ranging from the propensity to issue going concern audit opinions (Defond et al., 2002) or 
qualified audit opinions (Craswell, 1999; Hay et al., 2006) to the relationship between NAS 
fees and restatements (Kinney et al., 2004). As these measurements could have been affected 
by other circumstances there is always the possibility that they have led somewhat misleading 
results. For example, Craswell (1999) assumed that if an auditor with high levels of non-audit 
fees issued few qualified audit opinions the independence was likely to be impaired. However, 
a low amount of qualified audit opinions could also be explained by an ability to persuade 
clients into making the necessary adjustments before issuing the opinion. Such an ability to 
persuade clients could also be connected to a better relationship with the client, were the auditor 
is not only viewed as a controlling examiner but is also valued for the enhancements they can 
make to the business through non-audit services. Using qualified audit opinions as a proxy may 
therefore not be entirely ideal. 
 
Kinney et al. (2004), on the other hand, studied the amount of restatements in relation to NAS 
fees under the assumption that a large amount of restatements was connected to the auditor 
being persuaded to look the other way by their clients. This may be a more reliable 
measurement, but one must also remember that the audit function can never fully guarantee that 
the financial statements are completely free from misstatements. While some of the 
restatements found by Kinney et al. (2004) may have emanated from the auditor looking the 
other way this may thus not be true for all of them, as some may derive from this natural 
deficiency in the audit function. Following this discussion, the measurement of Defond et al. 
(2002) appears to be the most accurate proxy for auditor independence as going concern audit 
opinions cannot be avoided by any adjustments from the client and it is less unlikely that 
auditors miss something in regard to the financial viability of an enterprise. Therefore, one 
could regard the results of Defond et al. (2002) as the most reliable which suggests that NAS 
provision does not impair auditor independence in mind. However, it can never be guaranteed 
that researchers have not, consciously or unconsciously, affected the results of their research 
due to preconceptions. The findings of all of these studies could thus have been affected by the 
results desired by the researchers. From previous studies as well as our own it is therefore 
difficult to accurately determine whether or not the provision of NAS impairs auditor 
independence in mind.  
 
The results of our survey showed that 7 out of 10 non-audit services was perceived less 
compromising by top management than by auditors. In some cases the gap was significant, and 
especially the views on human resources and services linked to the financing and investment 
strategy stood out. These findings are thus in contrast to the UK study by Beattie et al. (1999) 
where top management was more critical towards NAS than auditors. On the contrary, some 
parallels can be drawn to the results of the Danish study by Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 
(2005) where it was concluded that managing directors were less critical towards the use of 
consulting services in comparison to other groups. As stated in the analysis, this could be a 
result of cultural and governmental dimensions.  
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The interview subjects were slightly more conservative, and although they had not themselves 
experienced the use of other services as compromising, there was a shared understanding that 
NAS could compromise auditor independence. Given that the above findings do not clearly 
promote prohibition of NAS nor discourage it, it is difficult to confirm or reject previous 
research. Previous studies have presented results on both sides of the specter, and although our 
data is not completely consistent, it could be argued that our results lean more towards the 
perception of NAS as less compromising. 
 
The survey indicated that the financial actors do see NAS as potential threat towards auditor 
independence, something the interview data supported, in line with a number of previous 
studies (eg. Scheifer and Shockley, 1990; Dart, 2011). However, in regard to both audit firm 
rotation and NAS, the interview data and survey suggest that although auditor independence is 
perceived important, there seems to be a limited interest in ensuring that auditor independence 
is intact. Our combined findings are thereby in line with the findings of the German study by 
Dyxhoorn and Sinning (1982). The interview data indicates that Swedish investors, fund 
managers and financial analysts do not reflect much over auditor independence when evaluating 
new investment options. The survey largely supports this finding, as the majority of private 
investors and financial analysts stated not to include auditor independence in investment 
evaluations or analyst reports. The survey data on fund managers provide indications that this 
group may include auditor independence in investment decisions to a larger degree than what 
was indicated in the interview. Moreover, it is to our understanding that scandals and media 
attention may have a greater impact on the financial market actors interest in auditor 
independence than regulatory changes. 
 
7.1.3 Contextual differences 
Previous studies on the perception of auditor independence have reached different conclusions. 
Even within the same countries these conclusions vary, something that indicate that it will be 
difficult to determine if the results of this study differ from others due to the characteristics of 
the Swedish context. On a cultural level it has been assumed that masculine countries, in 
comparison to feminine ones, are more accepting of questionable business practices like the 
provision of NAS. This study has, however, not been able to find any strong indications that 
these perceptions differ between masculine and feminine countries as the vast majority of 
previous studies have found that the provision of NAS has a negative impact on auditor 
independence. Some differences may be detected, however, as a comparison of our findings 
and those of Dart’s (2011) suggest that Swedish private investors perceive the provision of NAS 
as a bigger threat than that of UK investors. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this distinction 
may be explained by other factors and is not necessarily a consequence of the cultural dimension 
of masculinity.  
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Further, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) noted that a small audit profession might have 
bigger incentives to remain independent as it would be easier to incur at bad reputation. There 
is nothing in the previous studies that indicates if the opposite is true for countries like Germany, 
the UK and the U.S. where the audit profession is significantly larger. However, some 
indication that Swedish auditor’s find the costs of a bad reputation too overwhelming to risk 
has been found through the interviews, where one auditor stated that the big audit firms have 
too much to lose. This may therefore serve as an indication that Swedish auditors are more 
likely to act in line with national independence regulations and norms.  
 
Although contextual differences have not proved very prominent as the findings of this study 
both confirm and support the results of previous studies in various countries, our observations 
did present indications that studies from Anglo-Saxon countries have a tendency to be more 
critical towards auditor independence in comparison to the findings in this study and the studies 
from Germany and Denmark. This could be a result of the level of regulation in respective 
countries, and may indicate that the trust placed in the “invisible hand” in Anglo-Saxon 
countries seems rather fragile. However, considering the lacking consistency between studies 
from the same countries, this indication cannot be stated. We may conclude that although these 
indications are weak it is not possible to completely dismiss the notion that contextual 
differences can lead to differences in perception. 
 
7.2 The EU audit reform and Swedish implementation 
In this section the EU audit reform and Swedish implementation will be discussed in light of 
our findings from the key Swedish stakeholders´ perception of auditor independence. This 
discussion will largely be based upon the objectives of the EU audit reform as well as the 
possible consequences of implementing mandatory audit firm rotation and prohibit certain NAS 
in Sweden. 
 
7.2.1 The key Swedish stakeholders’ reactions to the EU audit reform 
Mandatory audit firm rotation was only considered to be a good tool to increase auditor 
independence by one of the interviewees, the chief of market surveillance of the Swedish 
Shareholder’s Association. This result was not entirely supported by the survey where the 
majority of all groups answered that mandatory audit firm rotation was a good tool to increase 
auditor independence. That financial market actors such as private investors believe that this 
measure would be appropriate in Sweden has thus been found in both data collection methods 
while the viewpoint of top management and auditors have differed. Two reasons behind a 
negative feel towards mandatory audit firm rotation have been found in these groups. First, it 
was stated that the relationship between the audit firm and client company is much more 
dynamic and that the current partner rotation in combination with top management rotation, 
makes firm rotation unnecessary. The belief was thus that familiarity threats is not as prominent 
as assumed since the personnel of both the audit team and the company management is ever 
changing. Secondly, the costs of changing audit firm were highlighted as this would inflict both 
administrative costs in addition to a possibly reduced audit quality from the steep learning 
curve. Moreover, the audit firms expressed a concern of the impact rotation may have on their 
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revenues when large audit clients must rotate, putting pressure on the firms to attract new 
clients. Since the interviews enabled managers and auditors to elaborate their thoughts on the 
matter of mandatory audit firm rotation, this suggests that these groups may in fact be more 
negative towards this measure than the survey data indicate. However, the correlation analysis 
suggested that a positive feeling towards this measure may be connected to the experience of 
audit tenure impairing independence. The difference in results between the survey and 
interviews could thus derive from a lack of auditors and managers in our sample with the prior 
experience of long relationships as a threat to independence.  
  
In regard to the prohibition of NAS, the viewpoint of financial market actors has been found to 
be positive in both data collection methods. The survey data suggests mixed feelings towards 
this measure in the top management and auditor groups, were both the negative and the positive 
standpoint received many followers. However, as a larger part of these groups did not agree 
that the provision of NAS is a threat to auditor independence this suggests a skepticism to the 
measure to prohibit these services. Both interviewed auditors and top management could 
understand why an outside party could perceive NAS as a threat but claimed to have not 
experienced this themselves. As previously discussed, the correlation analysis shows some 
indications that the auditors have answered the question about the impairing properties of NAS 
based upon services that would be allowed when following the current Swedish legislation. 
Combined with the interview data this can thus be taken as an indication that Swedish auditors 
might not perceive a need for the new auditor independence regulations inflicted by the EU as 
the already existing rules would be enough. Although the interviewed top management did not 
find it problematic to hire a third party to provide non-audit services in the future, they noted 
that, due to the company knowledge possessed by the audit team, it had been convenient to use 
the same audit firm. While the survey data suggests that top management are both positive and 
negative towards the prohibition of NAS the possibility to elaborate their thoughts in interviews 
suggested that the possibility to enhance auditor independence would be limited and may not 
be able to outweigh the costs.  
 
The viewpoint of auditor’s and top management therefore appears to be that neither mandatory 
audit firm rotation nor the prohibition of NAS is entirely suitable as these measures inflict large 
costs and uncertainties while it is unclear whether they will actually succeed in creating 
enhanced auditor independence. This indicates that both of these groups would prefer that the 
Swedish legislator extend the timeframe for rotation to 24 years and impose all of the 
derogations in regard to the prohibition of NAS.  
 
7.2.1 Auditor independence in mind 
The interview data suggests that auditor independence in mind will remain unaffected by the 
regulations that are soon-to-be implemented in Sweden. Independence in mind is difficult to 
evaluate, however, which can be seen from the previously conducted studies in this field. In our 
case, the indication that auditor independence will not be affected, mostly derives from the 
opinions of auditors who proclaimed that they themselves had not experienced audit tenure and 
NAS as impairing. On this matter, it should also be noted that due to the phenomenon of social 
desirability, the auditors may not want to reveal information on instances when they have 
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remained with an audit client despite feeling dependent. Moreover, auditors may also have an 
economic interest in portraying audit tenure and NAS as harmless to their independence. The 
reliability of these answers may thus be limited by this, something that may also apply to the 
top management that stated that auditor independence had not been impaired by long audit 
tenure or the provision of NAS as stating otherwise may be damaging for their investor 
relations. 
 
If we leave these concerns aside, this study suggests that auditor independence in mind will not 
be enhanced by the EU audit reform. While this may be a ‘socially desirable’ answer, the 
auditors made it clear that the current Swedish legislation and furthermore internal firm policies 
result in all questionable engagements being declined. If the analytical model of the Swedish 
auditors act 21 § is applied correctly by the Swedish auditors, the implementation of mandatory 
audit firm rotation and prohibition of NAS will thus have little or no positive effect on auditor 
independence in mind. However, it must be stressed that these results are not regarded to be 
fully reliable as it is impossible to guarantee that the auditors and top management has been 
entirely straightforward in their answers. Some potential for improving auditor independence 
in mind could, for example, be found in the survey data where a small minority of auditors 
found both a ten-year tenure and the provision of NAS as impairing. This may indicate a slight 
improvement of auditor independence in mind when mandatory audit firm rotation and the 
prohibition of NAS is implemented. However, the results that the majority of auditors were in 
agreement that a ten-year audit tenure and the provision of NAS does not impair independence 
in the survey combined with the results of the interviews suggests that the independence 
enhancing possibilities may be very limited.  As was found in the correlation analysis the results 
of the survey are less likely to have been affected by social desirability and these results can 
therefore be considered to strengthen the findings of the interviews. 
 
Moreover, in regard to the possible changes in the audit industry, it has been suggested that 
auditor independence in mind could decrease as a consequence of the reform. One of the 
auditors noted that the rotation of a large audit engagement in minor locations may leave the 
former audit firm with limited workload, while the new audit firm may be in great need of more 
resources to conduct the audit. One consequence is that members of the former audit team will 
rotate with their clients. If it can be assumed that a long audit tenure decreases auditor 
independence in mind, mandatory audit firm rotation may be insufficient in dealing with this 
issue as members of the audit team may remain with the client firm. While this was partially 
considered by the EU when retaining the audit partner rotation, other members of the audit team 
may be equally or even more important than the partner. In fact, in regard to the familiarity 
threat the partner might be less likely to form close relationships with the client since these 
often have less frequent contact with the client than other members of the team. The threats of 
long audit tenure could therefore be argued to be even more prominent with the other team 
members who are free to rotate with the client. The outcome of this possible consequence is 
uncertain, but it may still serve as an indication that policy development of the EU could be 
improved. 
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7.2.2 Auditor independence in appearance 
While it appears as the audit reform may be unsuccessful in enhancing auditor independence in 
mind, the results of both the interviews and the survey suggests that auditor independence in 
appearance may be strengthened. Whereas the perceptions of the three key stakeholder groups 
vary to some extent, there are indications suggesting that the financial market actors are in 
agreement with the EU that long audit tenure and the provision of NAS is a threat to auditor 
independence.  
 
As the majority of private investors and financial analysts perceived a ten-year audit tenure as 
a threat to auditor independence, this suggest that auditor independence could be enhanced by 
mandatory audit firm rotation. However, the appropriateness of the Swedish implementation 
can be questioned as the legislator has proposed to extend the allowed tenure to the maximum 
of 24 years. When the perceptions of auditor independence of the financial market actors appear 
to be affected already after a ten-year audit tenure, this extension can be assumed to 
substantially reduce the enhancement of auditor independence in appearance. This would imply 
that the policy development of the EU has been correct in regard to mandatory audit firm 
rotation whereas the Swedish legislator might be on the wrong track. Moreover, this puts further 
doubts on the appropriateness of the many member state options in regulation (EU) no 537/2014 
as the potential to enhance auditor independence in appearance would be greater without them. 
 
The Swedish financial market actors seem to have the same views of NAS as the EU as both 
the interview and the survey data suggest that their perceptions are negatively affected by the 
provision of all blacklisted services. Auditor independence in appearance may thus be enhanced 
by the implementation of prohibition of NAS in Sweden. Once again the Swedish 
implementation rather than the EU policy development can be questioned as the legislator has 
proposed to use all derogations. Even though this study has found indications that financial 
market actors’ perceptions of auditor independence are negatively affected by the blacklisted 
services, some tax and valuation services will still be allowed in Sweden. The potential of 
enhancing auditor independence in appearance will therefore be reduced due to the Swedish 
implementation. Once more it appears to be the member state options that limit the positive 
effects of the EU audit reform.  
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7.2.3 Financial market stability 
An important objective of the EU audit reform was to increase the financial market stability. 
The interview data indicates that increased financial market stability may be absent as neither 
private investors, fund managers nor financial analysts were believed to include auditor 
independence when evaluating investments or preparing reports. These results were not entirely 
supported by the survey data as about a third of the respondents from the private investor and 
financial analyst groups and 75 percent of fund managers responded that they do evaluate the 
auditor’s independence. Even though there are uncertainties surrounding the fraction of 
financial market actors that include auditor independence in their evaluation, the results would 
indicate that some of them do. Therefore, an increase of capital market confidence could be the 
result of the EU audit reform as the perceptions of the Swedish groups have been found to be 
in line with that of the EU. However, it should be noted that there are not sufficient grounds to 
believe that the objective of increased capital market confidence will be fulfilled as our research 
has detected a number of uncertainty factor surrounding this outcome.  
 
Market reactions pertaining to private investors or influenced by financial analysts could occur 
but both the survey and the interview data suggests that they would be very limited. The 
potential for market reactions are instead with the fund managers as the survey data suggests 
that this group do evaluate auditor independence. The claim of the interviewee fund manager 
that fund managers in general do not evaluate auditor independence is thus challenged by the 
fact that 75 percent (i.e. 9 individuals) of surveyed fund managers answered oppositely. It is 
thus difficult to conclude if fund managers in general evaluates auditor independence or not as 
the results of both data collection methods may have been influenced by response bias. That 
some fund managers do evaluate auditor independence is, however, certain from the survey 
results. However, it would appear as if the potential to increase market confidence is limited in 
Sweden due to the Swedish use of member state options. This means that even if Swedish 
financial market actors do evaluate auditor independence market reactions would be small as 
their perceptions of this does not appear to be in line with the Swedish implementation. 
 
7.2.4 Other potential consequences 
From the interviews it was found that the EU audit reform could have the unforeseen 
consequence of strengthening the position of the Big 4 audit firms. This is thus the contrary of 
the objective to open up the market and thereby include the smaller audit firms. Since this study 
has found that the audit reform may have a very limited effect on auditor independence and 
furthermore might not succeed in stabilizing the capital market, one can thus wonder if the 
inflicted costs are able to outweigh the benefits. One might also wonder if the turbulence that 
the reform may trigger in the audit industry can really be justified if the effects on auditor 
independence prove to be limited.  
 
One final effect from the implementation of this reform should be noted. Since the release of 
the green paper, the media has arguably drawn more attention towards auditor independence.  
This focus was highlighted by many in the interviews, implicitly indicating or explicitly 
pointing out that the debate on this cornerstone of auditing may enhance the Swedish social 
norms and thereby indirectly impact how and to what degree auditor independence will be 
considered in the future.  
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8. Conclusions 
Humphrey et al. (2011) has criticized the EU audit reform for being based upon assumptions. 
With basis in this argument, this thesis began by questioning if the EU would actually be able 
to achieve the objectives of the audit reform. The measures of mandatory audit firm rotation 
and the prohibition of NAS suggests that the EU assumes that financial market actors perceive 
long audit tenure and the provision of NAS as threats to auditor independence. That this could 
be the perception of these actors was also suggested by the results of this study, indicating that 
the EU has not based the audit reform on entirely groundless assumptions. However, the results 
of this study also suggest that Swedish financial market actors might not evaluate auditor’s 
independence in their investment decisions, indicating that the effects of the reform could be 
limited. The EU may therefore have taken for granted that enhanced auditor independence in 
appearance will lead to increased financial market stability. Furthermore, this finding suggests 
a high financial market confidence level in Sweden which may be seen as consequence of the 
characteristics of the Swedish context where ethical business behavior is expected. This may 
also indicate that in contexts where an emphasis on ethics is well incorporated into the national 
culture, the financial market actors would assume that the system is working and thereby take 
auditor independence for granted. 
 
Moreover, some indication that the EU might have based their assumptions on insufficient 
insights into the audit industry has been found as the EU audit reform might have limited effects 
on both auditor independence in mind and in appearance in Sweden. Our results indicate that 
the effects may be the opposite of the objectives, raising questions if the possible benefits of 
the reform will be able to outweigh the costs.  
 
8.1 Suggestions for future research 
It has been questioned whether or not the EU audit reform will lead to any market reactions. 
From the interview data this appears somewhat unlikely but the effects cannot be excluded as 
the survey indicated that at least some of the financial market actors would include auditor 
independence when evaluating an investment. There is therefore great potential of conducting 
an archival data study after the implementation of the EU audit reform to further investigate if 
the objective of increased financial market stability has been achieved. 
 
The scope of this thesis was limited to the measures of mandatory audit firm rotation and 
prohibition of NAS. However, the reform also contains other measures intended to enhance 
auditor independence as for example the strengthening of the audit committees. As the 
discussion of the effects of the audit reform may have been affected if this measure had been 
included, further studies on the key Swedish stakeholders’ perceptions and reactions to this 
measure are promising. Due to the unique Swedish feature of the nomination committee, this 
aspect may differ in Sweden in comparison to other EU member states. Moreover, we were 
unable to gain insights into the viewpoint of the board of directors and nomination committees 
of Swedish listed companies and future studies could therefore be aimed at including these.  
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Furthermore, while this study has been able to provide indications of the perceptions of one 
type of PIE, we do not know if the viewpoint of these differ from those of financial institutions 
such as banks. Therefore, future research could preferably be focused on mapping the 
perceptions of this group. 
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Appendix 1 – Interview guides 
 
The audit profession 
Part 1 – General questions about auditor independence 
1. What is auditor independence for you, which aspects are essential in order for an auditor 
to be independent in its work? 
2. Has your view on auditor independence changed from when you started as an auditor? 
In that case, how and why? 
3. Is it easier or harder to be independent in large listed companies? 
4. What do you believe are the normal reasons behind a change of audit firm? 
5. Do you think that auditor independence is misunderstood by external stakeholders? 
6. How do you think that stakeholders perceive auditor independence? 
 
Part 2 – Threats to auditor independence 
7. What do you believe is the biggest threat to auditor independence? 
8. In the new regulation the provision of NAS in combination with the audit is heavily 
criticized and EU also claim that long audit tenure affects the auditor’s independence. 
Do you agree with this? Why/ why not? 
9. Do you believe that the threats you mentioned are handled sufficiently in the current 
auditing practice? 
 
Part 3 – The EU audit reform 
10. What is your personal conception about the motives behind the EU audit reform? Can 
you tell us what you think is positive and negative about the implementation? 
11. What do you think about the prohibition of NAS? 
12. What do you think about mandatory audit firm rotation? 
13. Do you think that the EU audit reform will affect the Swedish audit industry and its 
structure? 
14. The competition of the Swedish audit industry is hard; do you think that the EU audit 
reform will enhance this? If yes, do you believe that the harder competition can affect 
the independence of auditors negatively? 
15. The Swedish Shareholder’s Association has expressed joy over the EU audit reform and 
mean that an auditor cannot be independent after ten years with the same client. What 
do you think about this? 
16. Do you believe that the threats to auditor independence is handled sufficiently in the 
current Swedish audit legislation or do you feel the need for an update or completion of 
the legislation? Motivate. 
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Questions especially developed for the Chief legal counsel of Swedish Institute of Authorised 
Public Accountants 
1. Do you have the feeling that the auditor’s independence is viewed as more important 
or has a more central role in the Swedish society in comparison to other EU countries? 
2. In what way do you think that the Swedish society separates themselves from other 
EU countries in regard to, for example, the market, norms and values? 
3. In which way do you think that these aspects affect the implementation of the EU 
audit reform in Sweden? 
4. Which effects do you think that the EU audit reform will have on the Swedish market 
and audit industry? 
5. Do you think that the effects will be stronger or weaker in Sweden in comparison to 
other EU countries, in particular in light of the Swedish use of member state options? 
6. You have expressed criticism to the implementation process of the EU audit reform in 
Sweden, what do you believe are the biggest challenges when the reform is 
implemented? 
7. In what way is the Swedish Institute of Authorised Public Accountants involved in the 
implementation? 
8. Do you think that the EU will be able to achieve the objectives of the reform? 
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Public interest entities 
Part 1 - General questions about auditor independence 
1. Which role do you think that the auditor plays in your company, why is it important for 
you to have an auditor? 
2. How would you describe the relationship that your company has with your auditor? 
3. What is auditor independence for you, which aspects are essential in order for an auditor 
to be independent in its work? 
4. How important do you think that the auditor’s independence is for your company’s 
investors? 
 
Part 2 – Audit tenure 
5. For companies that had remained with the same audit firm for a long time: We have 
noticed that you have had the same audit firm for X years, how do you see long audit 
tenure? 
6. For companies that had recently changed audit firm: We have noticed that you changed 
audit firm X years ago, can you tell us more about this? 
7. Do you think that a long work relationship with the audit firm is a threat to auditor 
independence? 
8. Are there any disadvantages or advantages of remaining with the same audit firm for a 
long time? 
9. Are there any disadvantages or advantages of changing audit firm? 
10. Why would a company normally change audit firm? 
11. Do you know how the board of directors and the shareholders of your company has 
reasoned around the choice of auditor? 
12. For companies that had remained with the same audit firm for a long time: How do you 
feel about changing audit firm? 
 
Part 3 – Non-audit services 
13. Many companies also hire their audit firm for other services, do you think that the 
provision of other services is a threat to auditor independence? 
14. For companies that used their audit firm for other services: We have noticed that you 
use your audit firm for tax services, can you tell us more about this? 
15. For companies that had previously used their audit form for other services: We have 
noticed that you previously used your audit firm for tax services, can you tell us more 
about this, have you stopped using your audit firm for these services, why? 
16. Could there be anything positive about hiring your audit firm for other services? 
 
Part 4 – The EU audit reform 
17. How much do you know about the EU audit reform? 
18. How do you feel about the measures that will be implemented (i.e. mandatory audit firm 
rotation and prohibition of NAS)? 
19. What do you think will be the consequences of these rules? 
20. For companies that would be forced to change audit firm soon: What do you think will 
be the most important factor when your company looks for a new audit firm? 
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21. For companies that used their audit firm for other services: How do you feel about hiring 
another firm for these services? 
 
Questions especially developed for the accounting expert of the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise 
1. You have previously expressed that a system where the auditor is prohibited from 
providing other services will probably be less effective than the current system and led 
to higher costs for listed companies, can you explain what you mean with that? 
2. You have also stated that the reform is developed without consideration for the audit 
firms or the companies that use their services, how do you think that the EU should 
have handled this? 
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Financial market actors 
Part 1 – General questions about auditor independence 
1. What role to you think that the auditor plays in the community? 
2. What is auditor independence for you, which aspects are essential in order for an auditor 
to be independent in its work? 
3. The medias’ focus on auditor independence has increased during the last decades, why 
do you think this has happened? 
 
Part 2 – Threats to auditor independence 
4. What do you believe is the biggest threat to auditor independence in Sweden? 
 
Part 3 – The EU audit reform 
5. Among the measures of the EU audit reform is mandatory audit firm rotation after ten 
years, what do you think about the appropriateness of this measure in Sweden? 
6. Another measure of the EU audit reform is the prohibition certain of Non-audit services, 
what do you think about the appropriateness of this measure in Sweden? 
7. Do you believe that the auditor’s independence actually can be enhanced by increased 
regulations as the EU asserts? 
8. Why do you think that the EU imposes these changes? 
 
Questions especially developed for the chief of market surveillance of the Swedish 
Shareholder’s Association 
1. You have figured in the media lately and talked about how important the EU audit 
reform is to increase auditor independence, why do you think that the reform will led 
to so much improvement? 
2. So you mean that the provision of NAS and long audit tenure has a negative impact on 
the auditor’s independence, do you think that it is as big of a threat as the EU indicate? 
3. Do you think that there is a need for this complement to the Swedish legislation? 
4. In the radio-debate between you and Dan Brännström it is quite clear that you have 
different perspectives on the auditor’s independence. Why do you think there is such a 
diverse perception of this aspect? 
5. You also stated that it is impossible for an auditor to be independent after ten years, 
can you explain this argument? 
6. You have previously mentioned many positive aspects of the implementation of the 
EU audit reform, do you see any negative aspects? 
7. The competition in the audit industry is already very tough, how do you think this will 
be affected by the EU audit reform? 
8. Based on your observations, how does private investors see the EU audit reform? 
9. How important do you think that the auditor’s independence is for the private 
investor? Is this something they reflect upon when evaluating new and old 
investments? 
10. Do you think that the EU audit reform is going to have a noticeable effect on the stock 
market, and in that case what effect? 
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Questions especially developed for the secretary general of the Swedish Society of Financial 
Analysts 
1. Do you think that it is important for the members of the Swedish Society of Financial 
analysts to be updated about the changes implemented through the EU audit reform? 
How do you think that the changes could affect the society? 
2. How do you think that the changes could affect the Swedish market, and especially 
your members? 
3. When booking this interview you wrote that the auditor’s independence is not very 
important for your members, why do you think that is the case? 
4. Do you mean that the auditor, generally speaking, plays a relatively small role for your 
members and to a lower degree effects how they evaluate listed companies? 
5. What are the important aspects when a financial analyst evaluates a listed company? 
6. Which group of stakeholder’s do you then believe has the most interest in regulations 
of the auditor’s independence? 
 
Questions especially developed for the fund manager 
1. Which effects do you think that this EU audit reform could have on the Swedish 
market? 
2. What impression do you have from the fund industry, how does the fund manager 
relate to the EU audit reform? 
3. Is the auditor’s independence important in your daily work as a fund manager?  
4. Have you ever experienced that a fund or investment has had a bad development due 
to a damaged auditor independence? 
5. Do you think that the EU audit reform will have any effects on your industry? 
6. If we look beyond the fund industry which group of stakeholder’s do you believe has 
the most interest in regulations of the auditor’s independence? 
 
  
102 
 
Appendix 2 – Survey questions 
 
TYPE OF QUESTION QUESTION 
1. YES/NO, DON’T KNOW  Do you believe that a forced change of audit firm 
after ten years (audit firm rotation) is a good tool to 
secure auditor independence? 
2. YES/NO, DON’T KNOW Do you believe that a prohibition for an audit firm to 
sell certain other services to a company they audit is 
a good tool to secure auditor independence? 
3. LIKERT SCALE 
1. FULLY AGREE 
2. PARTIALLY AGREE 
3. NEUTRAL 
4. PARTIALLY NOT AGREE 
5. FULLY NOT AGREE 
        -     DON’T KNOW 
Below a number of assertions are made that are 
answered by stating if you agree or not: 
When an audit firm has been hired by the same 
company for ten years the auditor cannot be 
independent anymore. 
In my opinion it is a sufficient measure to change the 
audit partner each seven years to protect auditor 
independence. 
The audit firm should also be changed periodically to 
protect auditor independence. 
The auditor is not independence anymore if the audit 
firm also sells other services to the company. 
That an audit firm sell other services to a company 
the audit makes them economically dependent on that 
company which means that the auditor cannot be 
independent anymore. 
That an audit firm provide other services to a 
company they audit means that they must review 
their own work which leads to the auditor not being 
able to be independent anymore. 
4. LIKERT SCALE 
1. FULLY AGREE 
2. PARTIALLY AGREE 
3. NEUTRAL 
4. PARTIALLY NOT AGREE 
5. FULLY NOT AGREE 
        -     DON’T KNOW 
Below a number of other services an audit firm can 
provide are mentioned, state if you agree or not that 
the provision of the following means that the auditor 
is not independent anymore: 
Tax consultation 
Bookkeeping services 
Payroll services 
Services related to internal controls 
Legal services 
Services involving promotion of, dealing in or 
underwriting shares in the company 
Human resource services such as the participation in 
the recruitment of leading positions in the company 
Services that on some way means taking part in the 
decision-making of the company 
Valuation services 
Services linked to the financing, capital structure and 
allocation, and investment strategy of the company 
5. COMMENTARY Do you have any other thoughts about auditor 
independence please feel free to share them below 
 
